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United	  States	  Budgetary	  Costs	  of	  Post-­‐‑9/11	  Wars	  Through	  FY2018:	  	  
	  
A	  Summary	  of	  the	  $5.6	  Trillion	  in	  Costs	  for	  the	  US	  Wars	  in	  Iraq,	  Syria,	  Afghanistan	  
and	  Pakistan,	  and	  Post-­‐‑9/11	  Veterans	  Care	  and	  Homeland	  Security1	  
	  Neta	  C.	  Crawford2	  Boston	  University	  	   November	  2017	  
	  
	  
“After	  16	  years,	  should	  the	  taxpayers	  of	  America	  be	  satisfied	  we	  are	  in	  a	  
‘stalemate’?	  I	  don’t	  think	  so.”	  	  
	  
Senator	  John	  McCain,	  Senate	  Armed	  Services	  Committee	  Hearing,	  
3	  October	  20173	  	  	   As	  of	  late	  September	  2017,	  the	  United	  States	  wars	  in	  Iraq,	  Afghanistan,	  Pakistan	  and	  Syria	  and	  the	  additional	  spending	  on	  Homeland	  Security,	  and	  the	  Departments	  of	  Defense	  and	  Veterans	  Affairs	  since	  the	  9/11	  attacks	  totaled	  more	  than	  $4.3	  trillion	  in	  current	  dollars	  through	  FY2017.	  	  Adding	  likely	  costs	  for	  FY2018	  and	  estimated	  future	  spending	  on	  veterans,	  the	  costs	  of	  war	  total	  more	  than	  $5.6	  trillion.4	  	  This	  report	  focuses	  on	  US	  federal	  budgetary	  costs	  and	  obligations	  for	  America’s	  wars	  since	  9/11.5	  	  	  
                                                1	  This	  updates	  Neta	  C.	  Crawford,	  “US	  Costs	  of	  Wars	  through	  2016,	  $4.79	  Trillion	  and	  Counting:	  Summary	  of	  Costs	  for	  the	  US	  Wars	  in	  Iraq,	  Syria,	  Afghanistan	  and	  Pakistan	  and	  Homeland	  Security”	  September	  2016	  and	  Neta	  C.	  Crawford,	  "US	  Costs	  of	  Wars	  Through	  2014:	  $4.4	  Trillion	  and	  Counting:	  Summary	  of	  Costs	  for	  the	  US	  Wars	  in	  Iraq,	  Afghanistan	  and	  Pakistan,"	  Costs	  of	  War,	  June	  2014.	  	  In	  June	  2014,	  I	  reported	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  major	  wars	  and	  Operation	  Noble	  Eagle,	  including	  OCO,	  homeland	  security,	  veterans,	  future	   obligations	   and	   interest	   on	   borrowing	   to	   pay	   for	   the	   wars	   through	   2014	   was	   about	   $4.4	   Trillion.	  Crawford,	  "US	  Costs	  of	  Wars	  Through	  2014."	  2	  I	  thank	  contributors	  to	  the	  Costs	  of	  War	  Project,	  especially	  Linda	  J.	  Bilmes,	  Stephanie	  Savell,	  and	  Catherine	  Lutz.	  I	  thank	  Paula	  Dias	  for	  her	  assistance	  on	  the	  DHS	  budget.	  3	  Senator	  John	  McCain,	  quoted	  in	  Claudia	  Grisales,	  “Senators	  Grill	  Mattis,	  Dunford	  on	  War	  Strategy	  in	  Afghanistan,”	  Stars	  and	  Stripes,	  3	  October	  2017,	  https://www.stripes.com/news/us/senators-­‐‑grill-­‐‑mattis-­‐‑dunford-­‐‑on-­‐‑war-­‐‑strategy-­‐‑in-­‐‑afghanistan-­‐‑1.490741#.WeOudxNSzUI.	  	  4	  All	  calculations	  were	  made	  and	  are	  reported	  here	  in	  current	  dollars.	  5	  On	  calculating	  the	  costs	  of	  wars,	  see:	  Joseph	  E.	  Stiglitz	  and	  Linda	  J.	  Bilmes,	  “Estimating	  the	  Costs	  of	  War:	  Methodological	  Issues,	  with	  Applications	  to	  Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan,”	  in	  Michelle	  Garfinkel	  and	  Stergis	  Skaperdas	  eds.,	  Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  the	  Economics	  of	  Peace	  and	  Conflict.	  (Oxford	  University	  Press:	  Oxford,	  2012).	  http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~mrgarfin/OUP/papers/Bilmes.pdf.	  	  	  
	    2 
The	   Pentagon	   publishes	   an	   “Estimated	   Cost	   to	   Each	   Taxpayer	   for	   the	   Wars	   in	  Afghanistan,	  Iraq	  and	  Syria,”	  which	  calculates	  the	  total	  taxpayer	  costs	  on	  those	  wars	  between	  Fiscal	  Years	  2001	  and	  2018.	  That	  report	  estimated	  that	  the	  total	  authorized	  spending	  for	  Afghanistan,	  Iraq,	  and	  Syria	  has	  been	  $1.52	  trillion,	  and,	  on	  that	  basis,	  estimated	  a	  total	  cost	  to	  the	  individual	  taxpayer	  of	  $7,740	  from	  FY2001	  to	  FY2018.6	  	  Using	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  estimate	  of	  global	  war	  on	  terror	  costs	  since	  2001,	  this	  report	  estimates	  that	  the	  total	  cost	  per	  individual	   taxpayer	   of	   the	   post-­‐‑9/11	   wars	   over	   this	   period	   is	   $23,386.	   Figure	   7	   in	   the	  Appendix	  compares	  these	  two	  estimates	  of	  the	  annual	  bill	  per	  taxpayer.	  Because	  the	  US	  went	  into	  deficit	  spending	  after	  9/11,	  the	  cost	  of	  war	  per	  taxpayer	  will	  be	  higher	  as	  the	  US	  pays	  interest	  on	  borrowing	  for	  war.	  	  The	  difference	  between	  this	  Costs	  of	  War	  Project	  estimate	  and	  other	  estimates	  is	  that	  it	   includes	   not	   only	   Pentagon/Department	   of	   Defense	   military	   spending,	   but	   other	   war-­‐‑related	  costs,	  including	  war-­‐‑related	  spending	  by	  the	  State	  Department,	  the	  Department	  of	  Veterans	   Affairs,	   and	   Homeland	   Security.7	   Further,	   as	   with	   previous	   reports,	   this	   report	  notes	   that	   every	  war	   costs	  money	   before,	   during	   and	   after	   it	   occurs	  —	   as	   governments	  prepare	  for,	  wage,	  and	  recover	  from	  armed	  conflict	  by	  replacing	  equipment,	  caring	  for	  the	  wounded	  and	  repairing	  infrastructure	  destroyed	  in	  the	  fighting.	  	  	  Table	  1,	  below,	  summarizes	  the	  estimated	  costs	  of	  these	  wars	  from	  FY2001	  through	  FY2018,	  not	  including	  future	  interest	  on	  any	  borrowing	  after	  FY2018,	  rounded	  to	  the	  nearest	  $billion.8	  Because	  Congress	  has	  not	  yet	  passed	  a	  FY2018	  budget,	  the	  figures	  for	  FY2018	  (in	  
italics)	   are	   estimates	   based	   on	   the	   previous	   year’s	   spending	   or	   on	   the	   amount	   that	   the	  relevant	  department	  has	  requested.	   	   In	  the	  case	  of	  Homeland	  Security	  spending,	  as	  of	  the	  FY2018	  budget	  request,	  the	  Homeland	  Security	  budget	  is	  no	  longer	  explained	  by	  the	  White	  House	  Office	  of	  Management	  and	  Budget.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
                                                6	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  “Estimated	  Cost	  to	  Each	  Taxpayer	  for	  the	  Wars	  in	  Afghanistan,	  Iraq	  and	  Syria.”	  July	  2017,	  http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2018/Section_1090_FY17_NDAA_Cost_of_Wars_to_Per_Taxpayer-­‐‑July_2017.pdf.	  7	  See	  the	  Appendix	  for	  a	  more	  detailed	  discussion.	  8	  These	  are	  conservative	  estimates.	  In	  cases,	  as	  this	  report	  discuss	  below,	  where	  the	  U.S.	  Office	  of	  Management	  and	  Budget	  or	  the	  relevant	  department	  does	  not	  have	  a	  budget	  yet,	  or	  those	  numbers	  are	  no	  longer	  public,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Homeland	  Security,	  this	  report’s	  estimates	  are	  based	  on	  the	  authorization	  for	  the	  previous	  year.	  
	    3 
Table	  1.	  Summary	  of	  US	  Federal	  War-­‐‑Related	  Spending	  in	  Billions	  of	  Current	  Dollars	  
(Rounded	  to	  the	  Nearest	  Billion),	  FY	  2001-­‐‑20189	  	  
Category	   $	  Billions	  	  All	  DOD	  and	  State	  Overseas	  Contingency	  Operations	  (OCO)	  Appropriations,	  FY2001-­‐‑2017	  	   1,878	  Estimated	  additional	  DOD	  base	  budget	  due	  to	  the	  post-­‐‑9/11	  wars,	  FY2001	  -­‐‑	  FY2017	   879	  Estimated	  GWOT	  Veterans	  spending,	  FY2001	  -­‐‑	  FY2017	   277	  Homeland	  Security	  spending	  for	  prevention	  and	  response	  to	  terrorism,	  FY2001-­‐‑	  FY2017	   783	  Estimated	  Interest	  on	  OCO	  borrowing	  for	  wars,	  FY2001-­‐‑FY2017	   534	  
Subtotal	  War	  Appropriations	  and	  War	  Related	  Spending	  through	  FY	  2017	   $4,351	  Estimated	  FY2018	  for	  DOD	  and	  State	  OCO,	  incl.	  Afghanistan,	  Iraq	  and	  Syria10	   70	  Estimated	  FY2018	  increase	  to	  the	  DOD	  base	  budget	  due	  to	  the	  post-­‐‑9/11	  wars	   33	  Estimated	   FY2018	   request	   for	   Homeland	   Security	   for	   prevention	   and	   response	   to	  terrorism11	   70	  Estimated	  FY2018	  GWOT	  Veterans	  spending	   20	  Estimated	  Interest	  on	  OCO	  borrowing	  for	  wars	  FY2018	   88	  Estimated	  Future	  Obligations	  for	  GWOT	  Veterans	  Medical	  and	  Disability	  2019	  -­‐‑	  205612	  	   1,000	  
Total	  War	  Related	  Spending	  through	  FY2018	  and	  Future	  Obligations	  through	  2056	   $5,632	  	  	   This	   and	   previous	   Costs	   of	   War	   Project	   estimates	   have	   never	   counted	   every	  budgetary	  expense	  related	  to	  these	  wars.	  	  For	  example,	  there	  are	  substantial	  costs	  of	  war	  to	  state	   and	   local	   governments	   that	   are	   not	   subsidized	   by	   the	   federal	   government,	   most	  significantly,	  perhaps,	  the	  costs	  of	  caring	  for	  the	  veterans	  of	  these	  wars.	  This	  report	  has	  also	  not	   counted	   here	   the	   value	   of	   the	   gifts	   the	   US	   makes	   in	   excess	   military	   equipment	   to	  countries	  in	  and	  near	  the	  war	  zones.	  For	  example,	  from	  2007	  to	  2017,	  the	  US	  provided	  or	  authorized	  gifts	  to	  Iraq	  of	  excess	  defense	  articles	  that	  initially	  cost	  more	  than	  $1.2	  billion	  to	  acquire	  and	  are	  currently	  valued	  at	  more	  than	  $200	  million	  dollars.	  Similarly,	  between	  2009	  and	  2015	  the	  US	  authorized	  gifts	  to	  Afghanistan	  of	  excess	  defense	  articles	  that	  cost	  more	  than	  $350	  million	  to	  acquire	  and	  are	  currently	  valued	  at	  $69.9	  million.13	  This	  report	  has	  also	  not	  included	  the	  value	  of	  military	  spending	  on	  these	  wars	  by	  US	  allies.	  In	  sum,	  although	  this	  report’s	  accounting	   is	  comprehensive,	   there	  are	  still	  billions	  of	  dollars	  not	   included	   in	   its	  estimate.	  
                                                9	  Rounded	  to	  the	  nearest	  $Billion.	  	  Totals	  may	  not	  add	  due	  to	  rounding.	  	  See	  Table	  6	  for	  a	  breakdown	  of	  these	  costs	  by	  Federal	  Department.	  10	  Members	  of	  Congress	  have	  indicated	  that	  Congress	  will	  likely	  appropriate	  more	  money	  than	  the	  Trump	  administration	  requested.	  11	  This	  estimate	  is	  based	  on	  last	  year’s	  appropriation.	  The	  Whitehouse	  no	  longer	  provides	  a	  breakdown	  of	  Department	  of	  Homeland	  Security	  expenditures.	  	  12	  See	  Linda	  J.	  Bilmes,	  "A	  Trust	  Fund	  for	  Veterans,"	  Democracy:	  A	  Journal	  of	  Ideas,	  no.	  39,	  (Winter	  2016),	  http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/39/a-­‐‑trust-­‐‑fund-­‐‑for-­‐‑veterans/	  and	  Linda	  J.	  Bilmes,	  "The	  Financial	  Legacy	  of	  Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan:	  How	  Wartime	  Spending	  Decisions	  Will	  Cancel	  Out	  the	  Peace	  Dividend,"	  Costs	  of	  War,	  (March	  2013),	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  her	  methods	  and	  assumptions.	  http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2013/The%20Financial%20Legacy%20of%20Iraq%20and%20Afghanistan.pdf.	  	  13	  Calculated	  from	  the	  Excess	  Defense	  Articles	  (EDA)	  Database,	  http://www.dsca.mil/programs/excess-­‐‑defense-­‐‑articles-­‐‑eda.	  Accessed	  28	  September	  2017.	  	  	  
	    4 
	  Moreover,	  a	  full	  accounting	  of	  any	  war's	  burdens	  cannot	  be	  placed	  in	  columns	  on	  a	  ledger.	   	   From	   the	   civilians	   harmed	   and	   displaced	   by	   violence,	   to	   the	   soldiers	   killed	   and	  wounded,	   to	  the	  children	  who	  play	  years	   later	  on	  roads	  and	  fields	  sown	  with	   improvised	  explosive	  devices	  and	  cluster	  bombs,	  no	  set	  of	  numbers	  can	  convey	  the	  human	  toll	  of	  the	  wars	  in	  Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan,	  or	  how	  they	  have	  spilled	  into	  the	  neighboring	  states	  of	  Syria	  and	  Pakistan,	  and	  come	  home	  to	  the	  US	  and	  its	  allies	  in	  the	  form	  of	  wounded	  veterans	  and	  contractors.	  	  Wars	  also	  entail	  an	  opportunity	  cost	  —	  what	  we	  might	  have	  done	  differently	  with	  the	  money	  spent	  and	  obligated	  and	  how	  veterans’	  and	  civilians’	  lives	  could	  have	  been	  lived	  differently.	  
	  There	  is	  some	  question	  about	  what	  to	  call	  these	  wars.	  After	  the	  9/11	  attacks,	  the	  US	  launched	  a	  “Global	  War	  on	  Terror”	  alongside	   its	  war	  against	   the	  Taliban	  and	  Al	  Qaeda	   in	  Afghanistan	  begun	  in	  October	  2001.14	  	  The	  US	  began	  its	  war	  in	  Iraq	  in	  2003	  and	  expanded	  the	  fight	  to	  Syria	  in	  August	  2014.	  The	  Pentagon	  has	  called	  the	  major	  wars	  by	  various	  names	  at	   different	   times.	   For	   example,	   from	  October	  7,	   2001	   to	  December	  31,	   2014,	   the	  war	   in	  Afghanistan,	  which	  includes	  operations	  in	  Pakistan,	  was	  called	  Operation	  Enduring	  Freedom	  (OEF),	  and	  “Af/Pak,”	  and	  since	  2014	  has	  been	  called	  Operation	  Freedom’s	  Sentinel	  (OFS).	  	  The	  war	  in	  Iraq	  was	  called	  Operation	  Iraqi	  Freedom	  (OIF)	  from	  March	  19,	  2003	  to	  August	  31,	  2010,	  when	   it	  became	  Operation	  New	  Dawn	  (OND)	  until	  December	  2011.	   	  The	   latest	  iteration	  of	  the	  Iraq	  war,	  (Post-­‐‑Operation	  New	  Dawn	  or	  P-­‐‑OND)	  which	  now	  includes	  Syria,	  began	  on	  August	  8,	  2014,	  and	  is	  called	  Operation	  Inherent	  Resolve	  (OIR).	  	  Other	  elements	  of	  the	  counterterror	  wars	  include	  operations	  in	  Somalia,	  Turkey,	  Yemen,	  Libya,	  and	  many	  other	  countries	  in	  Europe	  and	  Africa.	  The	  costs	  of	  these	  other	  operations	  are	  included	  when	  they	  are	   officially	   part	   of	   the	   OCO	   budget	   authorization.	   The	   Department	   of	   Veterans	   Affairs	  identifies	  the	  soldiers	  who	  have	  served	  in	  these	  operations	  as	  Global	  War	  on	  Terror	  (GWOT)	  veterans.	  Also	  known	  as	  the	  “post-­‐‑9/11	  wars,”	  the	  thread	  that	  ties	  together	  these	  operations,	  now	  in	  more	  than	  50	  countries,	  is	  a	  focus	  on	  what	  the	  current	  administration	  insists	  we	  call	  “radical	  Islamic	  extremism.”	  	  	  	   The	  US	  plan	  is	  essentially	  to	  defeat	  all	  “radical	  Islamist”	  groups	  militarily.15	  But	  the	  more	  people	  the	  US	  kills,	  the	  more	  seem	  to	  join	  the	  organizations	  the	  US	  was	  already	  fighting,	  even	  as	  new	  radical	  groups	  spring	  up.	  Further,	  political	  control	  of	  territory	  in	  Afghanistan,	  Iraq	   and	   Syria	   often	   switches	   hands	   or	   remains	   contested.	   Consider	   the	   situation	   in	  Afghanistan	  as	  an	  example	  of	  the	  difficulty	  of	  killing	  for	  peace.	  When	  the	  US	  invaded	  in	  2001,	  the	  US	  Central	  Intelligence	  Agency	  estimated	  that	  there	  were	  45,000	  Taliban.16	  	  There	  are	  no	  reliable	  estimates	  of	  the	  number	  of	  Taliban,	  Haqqani	  network,	  and	  Al	  Qaeda	  that	  have	  been	  killed	  by	  the	  US	  and	  its	  allies	  in	  Afghanistan	  since	  the	  US	  invasion	  on	  October	  7,	  2001,	  but	  
                                                14	  The	  Pentagon	  recognizes	  many	  regions	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Global	  War	  on	  Terror	  as	  can	  be	  illustrated	  in	  the	  list	  of	  places	  where	  service	  members	  can	  receive	  medals	  for	  GWOT	  service.	  http://www.people.mil/Portals/56/Documents/oepm/GWOT-­‐‑EM%20-­‐‑%20Approved%20AOEs%20for%20Ops%20-­‐‑%202017%2005%2011.pdf?ver=2017-­‐‑05-­‐‑24-­‐‑125043-­‐‑020.	  	  15	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  strategy	  as	  of	  late	  2016,	  see	  the	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  Inspector	  General,	  “Overseas	  Contingency	  Operations,	  FY2018	  Comprehensive	  Oversight	  Plan,”	  October	  2017,	  https://media.defense.gov/2017/Oct/18/2001829251/-­‐‑1/-­‐‑1/1/FY2018_LIG_COP_OCO_OCT2017.PDF	  	  16	  CIA,	  in	  Bob	  Woodward,	  Bush	  at	  War	  (New	  York:	  Simon	  and	  Schuster,	  2002)	  p.	  35.	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one	  2014	  estimate	  was	  that	  the	  US	  and	  its	  allies	  had	  killed	  20,000	  members	  of	  the	  Taliban.17	  US	   General	   Joseph	   L.	   Votel	   estimated	   in	   March	   2016	   that	   there	   are	   now	   20,000-­‐‑40,000	  opposition	   forces	   —	   including	   members	   of	   the	   Taliban,	   Al	   Qaeda	   and	   ISIL/ISIS	   —	   in	  Afghanistan.18	  As	  of	  the	  end	  of	  June	  2017,	  according	  to	  a	  US	  government	  report,	  the	  Afghan	  government	  controlled	  about	  60	  percent	  of	  Afghan	  territory,	  a	  six	  percent	  reduction	  of	  the	  amount	  it	  controlled	  at	  that	  same	  point	  in	  2016.19	  	  The	  Trump	  administration	  decided	  to	  increase	  the	  number	  of	  US	  military	  troops	  in	  Afghanistan	  in	  response	  to	  a	  Pentagon	  request	  for	  3,900	  additional	  troops.	  They	  will	  join	  the	  11,000	   US	   troops	   already	   there	   mostly	   to	   train	   and	   assist	   Afghan	   forces.20	   	   But	   Afghan	  security	   forces	   themselves	   are	   beleaguered.	   Recruitment	   and	   retention	   of	   Afghan	   armed	  forces	  and	  police	  is	  difficult.	  The	  Afghan	  government	  has	  stopped	  releasing	  the	  number	  of	  Afghan	   military	   and	   police	   killed	   and	   injured	   there	   –	   Afghan	   officials	   apparently	   now	  consider	  the	  death	  toll	  of	  its	  military	  and	  police	  forces	  as	  “classified.”21	  The	  US	  reported	  2,531	  Afghan	  security	   force	  personnel	  killed	   in	  action	   from	  1	   January	  to	  8	  May	  2017	  and	  4,238	  wounded	  in	  action.22	   	  Worse,	  United	  Nations	  reports	  document	  a	  rising	  toll	   in	  the	  civilian	  deaths	  and	  injuries	  over	  the	  last	  several	  years	  and	  the	  size	  of	  contested	  areas	  are	  growing.23	  The	  US	  recently	  moved	  to	  double	  the	  size	  of	  the	  safe	  area	  in	  Kabul,	  Afghanistan’s	  capital,	  the	  “Green	  Zone,”	  because	  the	  city	  is	  less	  safe	  after	  16	  years	  of	  war.	  	  	  In	  February	  2017,	  General	  John	  Nicholson,	  Commander	  of	  US	  forces	  in	  Afghanistan,	  testified	   before	   the	   Senate	   Armed	   Services	   Committee	   that	   the	   war	   there	   was	   at	   a	  “stalemate.”24	   	   “Neither	   the	  Taliban	  nor	   the	  ANDSF	   is	   currently	   capable	  of	   fundamentally	  altering	  the	  operational	  environment,	  which	  leaves	  the	  government	  in	  control	  of	  roughly	  two	  thirds	  of	  the	  population,	  the	  Taliban	  in	  control	  of	  approximately	  ten	  percent,	  and	  the	  rest	  
                                                17	  Akmal	  Dawi,	  “Despite	  Massive	  Taliban	  Death	  Toll	  No	  Drop	  in	  Insurgency,”	  Voice	  of	  America,	  26	  March	  2014.https://www.voanews.com/a/despite-­‐‑massive-­‐‑taliban-­‐‑death-­‐‑toll-­‐‑no-­‐‑drop-­‐‑in-­‐‑insurgency/1866009.html.	  	  18	  General	  Joseph	  L.	  Votel,	  “Advance	  Questions	  for	  General	  Joseph	  L.	  Votel,	  U.S.	  Army	  Nominee	  for	  Commander,	  U.	  S.	  Central	  Command,”	  3/9/2016,	  p.	  6.	  	  http://www.armed-­‐‑services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Votel_03-­‐‑09-­‐‑16.pdf.	  19	  Special	  Inspector	  General	  for	  Afghanistan	  Reconstruction	  (SIGAR),	  “Quarterly	  Report	  to	  the	  United	  States	  Congress,”	  30	  July	  2017,	  p.	  88.	  https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2017-­‐‑07-­‐‑30qr.pdf.	  	  20	  The	  Pentagon	  had	  said	  prior	  to	  August	  2017	  that	  8,400	  US	  troops	  were	  in	  Afghanistan,	  but	  in	  late	  August	  2017	  they	  acknowledged	  that	  many	  more	  were	  there	  on	  a	  “temporary”	  basis	  —	  less	  than	  six	  months.	  	  	  W.J.	  Henigan,	  “U.S.	  Has	  More	  Troops	  in	  Afghanistan	  than	  Previously	  Disclosed,”	  Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  30	  August	  2017,	  http://www.latimes.com/politics/washington/la-­‐‑na-­‐‑essential-­‐‑washington-­‐‑updates-­‐‑pentagon-­‐‑admits-­‐‑u-­‐‑s-­‐‑has-­‐‑more-­‐‑troops-­‐‑in-­‐‑1504121477-­‐‑htmlstory.html.	  	  21	  Helene	  Cooper	  and	  Rod	  Nordland,	  “As	  Trump	  Rolls	  Out	  War	  Plan,	  Taliban	  are	  Gaining,”	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  21	  August	  	  2017,	  https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/21/world/asia/trump-­‐‑afghanistan-­‐‑war-­‐‑taliban.html?mcubz=3.	  	  22	  SIGAR	  “Quarterly	  Report,”	  p.	  100.	  23	  See	  United	  Nations	  Assistance	  Mission	  in	  Afghanistan,	  on	  the	  Protection	  of	  Civilians,	  	  https://unama.unmissions.org/protection-­‐‑of-­‐‑civilians-­‐‑reports.	  	  24	  “We	  assess	  the	  current	  security	  situation	  in	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	  stalemate	  where	  the	  equilibrium	  favors	  the	  government.”	  General	  John	  W.	  Nicholson,	  “Statement	  for	  the	  Record,”	  Testimony	  before	  the	  Senate	  Armed	  Services	  Committee,	  9	  February	  2017,	  p.	  2.	  https://www.armed-­‐‑services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Nicholson_02-­‐‑09-­‐‑17.pdf.	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contested.”25	  	  A	  decisive	  and	  long-­‐‑term	  military	  defeat	  of	  opposition	  forces	  in	  Afghanistan	  is	  unlikely	  but	  the	  strategy	  seems	  to	  be	  more	  of	  the	  same,	  with	  its	  terrible	  toll	  in	  life	  and	  limb.	  
	  
Explanation	  of	  Estimate	  of	  Bottom	  Lines	  	   War-­‐‑related	   spending	   occurs	   in	   several	   areas	   of	   the	   US	   Federal	   budget.	   First,	   the	  special	   appropriations	   for	   war,	   described	   as	   emergency	   or	   “overseas	   contingency	  operations”	  (OCO),	  are	  direct	  war	  appropriations	  to	  the	  Department	  of	  Defense	  and	  State	  Department/US	   Agency	   for	   International	   Development	   (USAID).	   Congressional	  appropriations	  to	  the	  Pentagon	  from	  FY2001-­‐‑2017	  for	  both	  the	  wars	  and	  base	  budget	  have	  totaled	  more	  than	  $1.75	  trillion	  in	  current	  dollars.	  The	  Department	  of	  State	  has	  appropriated	  about	  $120	  billion	  for	  OCO	  operations	  during	  this	  period.	  The	  total	  OCO	  appropriations	  is	  thus	  more	  than	  $1.8	  trillion	  in	  current	  dollars.	  	  The	   Pentagon’s	   portion	   of	   the	   OCO	   spending	   is	   over	   and	   above	   the	   general	   and	  continuing	  funding	  for	  the	  Defense	  Department,	  known	  as	  the	  "base	  budget."	  But	  some	  of	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  Pentagon’s	  base	  budget	  is	  due	  to	  the	  wars	  in	  Afghanistan,	  Iraq,	  and	  the	  larger	  war	  on	  terror	  that	  have	  been	  institutionalized.	  An	  additional	  calculation	  is	  the	  portion	  of	  the	  increase	  to	  the	  Pentagon	  base	  budget	  from	  FY2001-­‐‑2017	  that	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  wars:	  about	  $800	  billion	  since	  2001.26	  	  	  The	  full	  budgetary	  burden	  of	  the	  wars	  also	  includes	  the	  costs	  of	  providing	  medical	  care	  and	  disability	  payments	  to	  the	  many	  veterans	  of	  these	  wars	  through	  the	  VA	  and	  Social	  Security	  Administrations.	  In	  addition,	  Homeland	  Security	  spending	  has	  increased	  by	  more	  than	  $500	  billion	  for	  missions	  related	  to	  preventing	  and	  responding	  to	  potential	  terrorist	  attacks.	  	  	  Further,	  any	  reasonable	  estimate	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  wars	  includes	  the	  fact	  that	  each	  war	  entails	  fulfilling	  the	  US	  obligation	  for	  medical	  care	  and	  support	  for	  wounded	  veterans	  for	   years	   to	   come.	   These	   future	   obligations	   will	   total	  at	   least	   an	   additional	   $1	   trillion	   in	  medical	  and	  disability	  payments	  and	  additional	  administrative	  burden	  through	  2056.	  	  The	  longer	  the	  US	  fights,	  and	  the	  greater	  the	  number	  of	  troops	  involved	  in	  combat,	  the	  larger	  the	  obligation	  the	  US	  assumes	  for	  the	  future	  care	  of	  its	  veterans.	  	   There	  is	  no	  end	  in	  sight	  to	  the	  US	  military	  presence	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  the	  associated	  operations	  in	  Pakistan.	  Similarly,	  despite	  recent	  gains,	  there	  is	  little	  clear	  sense	  of	  how	  long	  the	  US	  will	   be	   engaged	   in	   Iraq	   and	   Syria.	   After	   announcing	   a	  withdrawal	   of	  US	   forces	   in	  Afghanistan	   for	   2017,	   the	  Obama	   administration	   announced	   in	  mid-­‐‑2016	   that	   a	   planned	  
                                                25	  John	  W.	  Nicholson,	  “Statement	  for	  the	  Record,”	  p.	  11.	  	  26	  This	  estimate	  assumes	  that	  additions	  to	  the	  Pentagon	  base	  budget	  are	  in	  proportion	  to	  OCO	  spending.	  	  I	  calculated	  additions	  to	  the	  Pentagon	  base	  from	  2001-­‐‑2003	  as	  30%	  of	  OCO	  spending;	  at	  40%	  of	  OCO	  spending	  from	  2004	  to	  2008;	  and	  at	  50%	  of	  OCO	  spending	  from	  2009-­‐‑2017.	  	  Note	  that	  there	  is	  also	  an	  incentive	  to	  put	  non-­‐‑war	  base	  spending	  in	  the	  OCO	  appropriations	  since	  they	  are	  not	  subject	  to	  the	  same	  budget	  control	  as	  regular	  spending.	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reduction	   of	  US	   troops	  would	   go	  more	   slowly	   than	  previously	   announced.27	   	   The	  Trump	  administration	  announced	  both	  an	  increase	  in	  overall	  military	  spending	  and	  an	  increased	  troop	   commitment	   to	  Afghanistan.28	   Thus,	   future	  military	   spending	   on	   the	   counterterror	  wars	  is	  likely	  to	  rise.	  	  	   Finally,	  these	  wars	  have	  been	  largely	  paid	  for	  by	  borrowing,	  part	  of	  the	  reason	  the	  US	  went	  from	  budget	  surplus	  to	  deficits	  after	  2001.	  	  Even	  if	  the	  US	  stopped	  spending	  on	  war	  at	  the	  end	  of	  this	  fiscal	  year,	  interest	  costs	  alone	  on	  borrowing	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  wars	  will	  continue	  to	  grow	  apace.	  	  The	  US	  has	  already	  paid	  some	  interest	  on	  borrowing,	  estimated	  here	  through	  the	  current	  fiscal	  year.	  Future	  interest	  costs	  for	  overseas	  contingency	  operations	  spending	  alone	  are	  projected	  to	  add	  more	  than	  $1	  trillion	  dollars	  to	  the	  national	  debt	  by	  2023.	  By	  2056,	  a	  conservative	  estimate	  is	  that	  interest	  costs	  will	  be	  about	  $8	  trillion	  unless	  the	  US	  changes	  the	  way	  that	  it	  pays	  for	  the	  wars.	  	  Although	  it	  is	  unlikely,	  Congress	  could	  decide	  to	  increase	  taxes	  or	  sell	  large	  numbers	  of	  war	  bonds	  rather	  than	  continue	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  wars	  through	  borrowing.	  	  In	  what	   follows,	   these	   categories	   and	   estimates	   of	   costs	   of	  war	   are	  discussed	   and	  explained	  in	  greater	  detail.	  An	  appendix	  goes	  into	  further	  detail.	  
	  
	  











                                                27	  Missy	  Ryan	  and	  Karen	  DeYoung,	  "Obama	  Alters	  Afghanistan	  Exit	  Plan	  Once	  More,	  Will	  Leave	  8,400	  Troops,"	  
The	  Washington	  Post,	  6	  July	  2016,	  https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-­‐‑security/obama-­‐‑alters-­‐‑afghanistan-­‐‑exit-­‐‑plan-­‐‑once-­‐‑more/2016/07/06/466c54f2-­‐‑4380-­‐‑11e6-­‐‑88d0-­‐‑6adee48be8bc_story.html.	  28	  Michael	  D.	  Shear	  and	  Jennifer	  Steinhauer,	  “Trump	  to	  Seek	  $54	  Billion	  Increase	  in	  Military	  Spending,”	  The	  
New	  York	  Times,	  27	  February,	  2017,	  https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/27/us/politics/trump-­‐‑budget-­‐‑military.html?mcubz=3.	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Table	  2.	  Cumulative	  Direct	  War	  Appropriations	  for	  DOD	  and	  State	  
Department/USAID	  for	  "Emergency"	  or	  "Overseas	  Contingency	  Operations"	  	  










FY2018	  	  Iraq	   $819.1	   1	   820.1	  Syria	   28.1	   13	   41.1	  Afghanistan	  (incl.	  Pakistan	  CSF)30	   877.4	   48.9	   926.3	  Pakistan31	   9.9	   .9	   10.8	  Operation	  Noble	  Eagle	  (ONE)32	   25.1	   -­‐‑	   25.1	  Other	   OCO	   missions	   and	   the	  Bipartisan	  Budget	  Act33	   118.5	   5.7	   	   124.2	  
Total	  	   $1,878	  billion	   $69.6	  billion	   $1,947.6	  billion	  	  
                                                29	  Rounded	  to	  the	  nearest	  $100	  million.	  Totals	  may	  not	  add	  due	  to	  rounding.	  Sources:	  Amy	  Belasco,	  "The	  Cost	  of	  Iraq,	  Afghanistan,	  and	  Other	  Global	  War	  on	  Terror	  Operations	  Since	  9/11,"	  Congressional	  Research	  Service	  (CRS)	  8	  December	  2014;	  the	  U.S.	  	  Department	  of	  Defense	  Comptroller	  for	  recent	  and	  future	  spending,	  Office	  of	  the	  Under	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  Office	  (Comptroller)	  "Fiscal	  Year	  2017	  Budget	  Request:	  Overview";	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  Inspector	  General,	  “Overseas	  Contingency	  Operations,	  FY2018	  Comprehensive	  Oversight	  Plan,”	  October	  2017,	  https://media.defense.gov/2017/Oct/18/2001829251/-­‐‑1/-­‐‑1/1/FY2018_LIG_COP_OCO_OCT2017.PDF	  ;	  Susan	  B.	  Epstein,	  Marian	  Leonardo	  Lawson	  and	  Alex	  Tiersky,	  "State,	  Foreign	  Operations,	  and	  Related	  Programs:	  FY2013	  Budget	  and	  Appropriations,"	  CRS,	  23	  July	  2012,	  for	  State	  Department	  Spending	  FY2011-­‐‑2013;	  Pakistan,	  K.	  Alan	  Kronstadt	  and	  Susan	  B.	  Epstein,	  "Direct	  Overt	  U.S.	  Aid	  Appropriations	  for	  and	  Military	  Reimbursements	  to	  Pakistan,	  FY	  2002-­‐‑FY2018,"	  6	  September	  2016	  and	  previous	  CRS	  reports	  for	  Pakistan.	  Operation	  Noble	  Eagle	  (ONE),	  begun	  on	  9/11,	  includes	  enhanced	  security	  for	  military	  bases	  and	  US	  airspace	  provided	  by	  the	  US	  military	  in	  the	  DOD	  budget.	  ONE	  was	  transferred	  to	  the	  Base	  Budget	  in	  2005.	  This	  report	  includes	  it	  in	  the	  estimate	  of	  OCO	  spending	  through	  FY2004.	  30	  Includes	  Coalition	  Support	  Funds	  for	  Pakistan.	  31	  This	  figure	  includes	  only	  US	  security	  related	  funding	  that	  is	  not	  for	  Coalition	  Support	  Funds	  (CSF).	  	  Coalition	  Support	  Funds	  for	  Pakistan	  are	  part	  of	  the	  OCO	  spending	  for	  operations	  in	  Afghanistan.	  	  Both	  the	  DOD	  and	  State	  Department	  receive	  other	  OCO	  funding	  for	  Pakistan.	  For	  accounting	  purposes,	  this	  report	  has	  counted	  these	  appropriations	  under	  the	  State	  Department	  although	  this	  is	  not	  entirely	  accurate.	  For	  example,	  the	  largest	  single	  element	  of	  the	  8	  billion	  is	  Foreign	  Military	  Financing	  (FMF)	  is	  a	  State	  Department	  appropriation	  for	  Foreign	  Operations	  that	  is	  managed	  by	  the	  Department	  of	  Defense.	  	  The	  next	  largest	  element	  of	  spending	  is	  the	  Pakistan	  Counterinsurgency	  Fund	  and	  the	  Pakistan	  Counterinsurgency	  Capability	  Fund;	  the	  former	  is	  overseen	  by	  the	  Pentagon,	  and	  the	  latter	  by	  the	  State	  Department.	  Smaller	  funds	  for	  Counternarcotics	  are	  Pentagon	  appropriations.	  	  For	  a	  complete	  breakdown	  and	  explanation,	  see	  Krondstadt	  and	  Epstein,	  "Direct	  Overt	  U.S.	  Aid	  Appropriations	  for	  and	  Military	  Reimbursements	  to	  Pakistan,	  FY	  2002-­‐‑FY2017."	  32	  Operation	  Noble	  Eagle	  (ONE),	  begun	  on	  9/11	  includes	  the	  enhanced	  security	  for	  military	  bases	  and	  US	  airspace	  provided	  by	  the	  US	  military	  in	  the	  DOD	  budget.	  ONE	  was	  transferred	  to	  the	  Base	  Budget	  in	  2005.	  This	  report	  includes	  it	  in	  its	  estimate	  of	  OCO	  spending	  through	  FY2004.	  	  33	  Belasco	  describes,	  “Other	  war	  spending,”	  by	  DOD	  and	  the	  State	  Department	  designated	  for	  war	  but	  not	  part	  of	  war	  operations	  or	  direct	  support.”	  Belasco,	  "The	  Cost	  of	  Iraq,	  Afghanistan,	  and	  Other	  Global	  War	  on	  Terror	  Operations	  Since	  9/11,"	  Congressional	  Research	  Service	  (CRS)	  8	  December	  2014,	  p.	  7.	  	  Other	  missions	  include	  the	  “DOD	  European	  Reassurance	  Initiative,	  Operation	  Odyssey	  Lightening,	  the	  Counter	  ISIS	  Train	  and	  Equip	  Fund,	  the	  DOD	  Counter	  Terrorism	  Partnership	  Fund,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  See	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  Under	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  Office	  (Comptroller)	  for	  Fiscal	  Years	  2017	  and	  2018,	  for	  a	  discussion.	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Figure	  1,	  below,	  shows	  the	  flow	  of	  funding	  OCO	  since	  2001.	  It	  consolidates	  the	  OCO	  for	   the	   Defense	   and	   State	   Departments	   and	   groups	   the	   spending	   for	   closely	   related	  war	  zones,	   specifically	  Afghanistan	   and	  Pakistan,	   and	   Iraq	   and	  Syria.	  Unless	   otherwise	  noted,	  focus	  is	  on	  the	  major	  operations	  associated	  with	  the	  war	  zones	  of	  Afghanistan/Pakistan	  and	  Iraq/Syria.	  The	  Other	  War	  Designated	  OCO	  includes	  moneys	  designated	  as	  OCO	  spending.34	  	  Yet	  another	  category	  of	  spending	  not	  included	  here	  are	  the	  overseas	  contingency	  operation	  (OCO)	  spending	  funded	  in	  the	  base	  budget	  for	  Africa	  (in	  Uganda,	  Trans-­‐‑Sahara	  and	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa),	  the	  Caribbean,	  and	  Central	  America	  (as	  part	  of	  Operation	  Enduring	  Freedom).35	  	  
Figure	  1.	  Annual	  Appropriations	  by	  Major	  War	  Zone/Overseas	  Contingency	  
Operations	  for	  DOD	  and	  State/USAID,	  FY2001-­‐‑2018	  (Billions	  of	  Current	  Dollars)36	  
	  
                                                34	  These	  have	  included	  the	  DoD	  European	  Reassurance	  Initiative,	  Operation	  Odyssey	  Lightening,	  the	  Counter	  ISIS	  Train	  and	  Equip	  Fund,	  the	  DoD	  Counterterrorism	  Partnership	  Fund,	  and	  so	  on	  as	  detailed	  by	  the	  Comptroller	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  Defense	  in	  various	  years.	  	  For	  a	  recent	  example,	  see	  chapter	  6	  of	  Comptroller’s	  Defense	  Budget	  Overview,	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  Fiscal	  Year	  2018	  Budget	  Request.	  http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2018/fy2018_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.	  	  35	  For	  instance,	  these	  are	  called	  Operation	  Enduring	  Freedom	  Caribbean	  and	  Central	  America	  (OEF-­‐‑CCA),	  Operation	  Enduring	  Freedom	  Trans	  Sahara	  (OEF-­‐‑TS),	  Operation	  Enduring	  Freedom	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  (OEF-­‐‑HOA).	  	  See	  for	  instance,	  Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  Fiscal	  Year	  2014,	  President’s	  Budget,	  	  http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2014/FY2014_Presidents_Budget_Contingency_Operations(Base_Budget).pdf.	  	  And	  Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  Fiscal	  Year	  (FY)	  2018	  Justification	  for	  Base	  Funded	  Contingency	  Operations	  and	  the	  Overseas	  Contingency	  Operations,	  http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2018/FY2018_OCOTF_Justification_Book_FINAL.pdf.	  	  36	  Belasco,	  "The	  Cost	  of	  Iraq,	  Afghanistan,	  and	  Other	  Global	  War	  on	  Terror	  Operations	  Since	  9/11,"	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Figure	  2,	  below,	  illustrates	  the	  share	  of	  the	  total	  OCO	  budget	  that	  has	  been	  allocated	  to	  the	  major	  OCO	  activities	  from	  FY2001	  to	  FY2017.	  	  To	  estimate	  the	  proportion	  of	  total	  costs	  that	  could	  be	  attributed	  to	  each	  war	  zone,	  based	  on	  the	  proportion	  OCO	  spending	  through	  FY2017,	  one	  could	  attribute	  less	  than	  1%	  of	  total	  costs	  to	  the	  war	  in	  Syria,	  44%	  to	  the	  Iraq	  war	  and	  about	  47%	  to	  the	  war	  in	  Afghanistan/Pakistan.	  Spending	  on	  other	  OCO	  missions	  and	  operations	  accounts	  for	  about	  8%	  of	  the	  total	  OCO	  spending.	  “Other”	  spending	  includes	  about	  $10	  billion	  spent	  since	  FY2015	  for	  a	  DOD	  European	  Reassurance	  Initiative,	  meant	  “to	  deter	  Russia	  and	  reassure	  U.S.	  allies	  and	  partners,	  particularly	  within	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe”	  and	  money	   for	  air	   strikes	  against	   ISIS	   in	  Libya,	  begun	   in	  August	  2016	  known	  as	  Operation	  Odyssey	  Lightening.37	  	  	  	  
Figure	  2.	  Shares	  of	  Overseas	  Contingency	  Operation	  (OCO)	  Spending,	  FY2001-­‐‑2017	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Pakistan	  	  The	  OCO	  budget	  for	  the	  Departments	  of	  Defense	  and	  the	  State	  Department	  contain	  many	  programs	  and	  projects	  outside	  of	  Afghanistan,	  Iraq,	  and	  Syria.	  	  The	  most	  significant	  of	  these	  zones	  of	  operation,	  due	  to	  its	  centrality	  to	  the	  war	  in	  Afghanistan,	  is	  Pakistan,	  regarded	  as	   part	   of	   the	   area	   of	   operations	   for	   Afghanistan	   Operation	   Enduring	   Freedom	   and	   its	  successor,	  Operation	  Freedom’s	  Sentinel.	  	  	  There	   are	   three	   ways	   the	   US	   operates	   in	   Pakistan.	   Since	   2001,	   the	   US	   has	   used	  Pakistan	   as	   an	   overland	   route	   for	   supplies	   to	   Afghanistan.	   	   The	   US	   reimburses	   and	  compensates	  Pakistan	  for	  the	  use	  of	  its	  ports	  and	  overland	  transportation	  of	  food,	  fuel	  and	  military	  equipment	  through	  Pakistan	  en	  route	  to	  Afghanistan	  with	  Coalition	  Support	  Funds	  (CSF),	  which	  are	  included	  in	  the	  budget	  for	  OCO	  in	  Afghanistan.	  	  Since	  the	  start	  of	  the	  war	  in	  Afghanistan,	   the	  US	  has	  provided	  about	  $14.5	  billion	   in	  Coalition	  Support	  Funds	  (CSF)	   to	  Pakistan.	   The	   Department	   of	   Defense	   describes	   the	   role	   of	   Coalition	   Support	   Funds	   as	  reimbursement	  for	  "expenses	  Pakistan	  incurs	  to	  conduct	  operations	  against	  al	  Qaeda	  and	  Taliban	  forces	  include	  providing	  logistical	  support	  for	  its	  forces,	  manning	  observation	  posts	  along	  the	  Afghanistan	  border,	  and	  conducting	  maritime	  interdiction	  operations	  and	  combat	  air	  patrols."40	  As	  the	  US	  has	  reduced	  its	  presence	  in	  Pakistan,	  the	  importance	  of	  this	  role	  has	  declined,	  as	  have	  the	  associated	  Coalition	  Support	  Funds.	   	  In	  the	  future,	  CSF	  may	  increase	  when	   the	   additional	   troops	   are	   deployed	   to	   Afghanistan,	   although	   the	   timeline	   for	  deployments	  and	  the	  extent	  of	  Pakistan’s	  involvement	  is	  unclear	  at	  this	  time.	  	  Pakistan	  is	  also	  an	  important	  zone	  of	  US	  military	  operations,	  including	  drone	  strikes	  and	  cross-­‐‑border	  attacks	  against	  Al	  Qaeda,	  the	  Taliban	  and	  other	  opposition	  forces.	  	  Since	  2004,	  when	  the	  drone	  strike	  program	  began,	  the	  US	  Central	  Intelligence	  Agency	  has	  made	  approximately	  400	  drone	  strikes	  in	  Pakistan,	  mostly	  in	  the	  so-­‐‑called	  Tribal	  Areas,	  near	  the	  border	  with	  Afghanistan.	  	  	  Further,	  the	  US	  is	  also	  a	  direct	  supplier	  of	  military	  assistance,	  equipment	  and	  training	  for	   Pakistan's	   military	   forces	   in	   their	   operations	   against	   opposition	   forces,	   including	   al	  Qaeda,	  the	  Taliban,	  and	  the	  Haqqani	  network.	  One	  sign	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  Pakistan	  to	  the	  US	  is	  that	  the	  US	  State	  Department	  has	  also	  hardened	  its	  embassy	  and	  generally	  increased	  the	  security	  of	  US	  personnel	  in	  Pakistan.	  	  In	  sum,	  since	  2001,	  including	  Coalition	  Support	  Funds,	  the	  US	  has	  spent	  more	  than	  $25	  billion	  for	  security-­‐‑related	  purposes	  in	  Pakistan,	  including	  the	  money	  likely	  to	  be	  spent	  by	  the	  end	  of	  FY2017	  and	  the	  Trump	  administration’s	  request	  for	  FY2018.	  	  In	  some	  years,	  as	  Figure	   3	   illustrates,	   US	   direct	   security	   assistance	   and	   CSF	   funding	   has	   accounted	   for	   a	  significant	  share	  of	  Pakistan’s	  overall	  military	  budget.	  	  	  
                                                40	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  "Overseas	  Contingency	  Operations,"	  http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2016/budget_justification/pdfs/01_Operation_and_Maintenance/O_M_VOL_1_PART_2/DSCA_OCO_OP-­‐‑5.pdf.	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Figure	  3.	  Trends	  in	  Percent	  of	  Pakistan's	  Military	  Budget	  from	  US	  Security	  Assistance	  
and	  Coalition	  Support	  Funds	  Reimbursement,	  2001-­‐‑201641	  	  
	  	  These	  figures	  for	  US	  spending	  on	  security	  assistance	  to	  Pakistan	  do	  not	  include	  the	  value	  of	  weapons	  and	  other	  military	  equipment	  that	  the	  US	  has	  donated	  to	  Pakistani	  military	  forces.	   	   For	   example,	   from	   2007	   to	   2016,	   the	   value	   of	   Excess	   Defense	   Articles	   given	   to	  Pakistan	  was	  more	  than	  $176	  million.42	  The	  Excess	  Defense	  Articles	  delivered	  to	  Pakistan	  since	  2001	   include	  14	  F-­‐‑16	   fighters	  delivered	   in	  2007	  and	  2008,	  550	  armored	  personnel	  carriers	  delivered	  in	  2010,	  and	  more	  than	  100,000	  rounds	  of	  ammunition	  for	  helicopters	  in	  2016.43	  	  	  While	  the	  Bush	  and	  Obama	  administrations	  emphasized	  the	  necessity	  of	  cooperation	  with	  Pakistan	  for	  the	  success	  of	  the	  war	  in	  Afghanistan,	  the	  Trump	  administration	  has	  said	  recently	  that	  it	  does	  not	  appreciate	  Pakistan’s	  role	  in	  the	  war	  and	  indicated	  that	  it	  would	  like	  Pakistan	   to	  be	  either	   a	  better	  partner	  or	   the	  US	  would	   turn	  elsewhere,	  notably,	   India.	   In	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August	  2017,	  President	  Trump	   said,	   “We’ve	  been	  paying	  Pakistan	  billions	   and	  billions	  of	  dollars,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  they	  are	  housing	  the	  very	  terrorists	  we	  are	  fighting.”44	  	  In	  August	  2017,	   the	   Trump	   administration	   told	   Congress	   that	   it	   was	   withholding	   $255	   million	  designated	   for	  Pakistan	   in	   the	  FY2016	  budget	  unless	  and	  until	   the	  Pakistani	  government	  became	  more	  aggressive	  against	  the	  Taliban	  and	  Haqqani	  network	  sheltering	  in	  Pakistan.45	  	   The	  US	  has	  also	  provided	  Pakistan	  with	  economic	  and	  humanitarian	  assistance	  since	  2001,	  totaling	  nearly	  $11	  billion	  through	  FY2017.	  The	  Trump	  administration	  requested	  that	  Congress	  appropriate	  an	  additional	  $211	  million	  in	  economic	  aid	  for	  Pakistan	  for	  FY2018.	  	  Economic	  assistance	  is	  neither	  specifically	  security	  related,	  nor	  part	  of	  the	  OCO	  budget	  that	  is	  used	  for	  Pakistan.	  	  	  	  While	  it	  is	  arguable	  that	  some	  of	  that	  US	  economic	  and	  humanitarian	  aid	  is	  used	  for	  security	  purposes,	  or	  is	  used	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  refugees	  and	  food	  insecurity	  caused	  by	  fighting	  in	  the	  border	  region,	  this	  report	  does	  not	  count	  this	  assistance	  as	  part	  of	  the	  war	  effort	  and	  reports	  here	  only	  the	  Congressional	  Research	  Service	  numbers	  for	  security	  assistance	  and	  CSF.46	  Despite	  this,	  this	  report	  notes	  that,	  beyond	  that	  used	  for	  disaster	  assistance,	  most	  of	  economic	  assistance	  money	  would	  probably	  not	  have	  gone	  to	  Pakistan	  absent	  the	  US	  war	  in	  Afghanistan	  since	  the	  US	  was	  giving	  little	  or	  no	  economic	  aid	  to	  Pakistan	  prior	  to	  the	  9/11	  attacks.	   	   All	   told,	   Pakistan	   has	   received	  more	   than	   $33	   billion	   in	   economic	   and	   security	  assistance	  (including	  Coalition	  Support	  Funds	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Afghanistan	  operational	  budget)	  since	  2002.	  	  
	  
Other	  Zones	  of	  Operation	  	  Outside	  the	  main	  war	  zones	  of	  Afghanistan/Pakistan	  and	  Iraq/Syria,	  other	  military	  assistance	  programs	  and	  coalition	  members	  receive	  funding	  from	  the	  US	  as	  part	  of	  the	  OCO	  budget.	   	  Croatia,	  Georgia,	  Hungary,	  Jordan,	  Poland	  and	  Romania	  receive	  Coalition	  Support	  Funds	   from	   the	   OCO	   budget,	   as	   reimbursements	   for	   their	   work	   in	   US	   wars.47	   	   As	   the	  Department	  of	  Defense	  argues,	   "Reimbursing	  partner	  nation	  efforts	   is	  critical	   to	  enabling	  forces	   from	   eligible	   foreign	   countries	   to	   remain	   in	   theater	   and	   support	   US	   military	  operations.	  Without	  financial	  support,	  many	  of	  these	  nations	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  participate	  
                                                44	  James	  Griffiths,	  “Trump	  Calls	  Out	  Pakistan,	  India,	  as	  he	  Pledges	  to	  ‘Fight	  to	  Win’	  	  in	  Afghanistan,”	  CNN,	  24	  August	  2017	  http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/21/politics/trump-­‐‑afghanistan-­‐‑pakistan-­‐‑india/index.html.	  	  45	  Gardiner	  Harris,	  “U.S.	  Gives	  Military	  Assistance	  to	  Pakistan,	  With	  Strings	  Attached,”	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  30	  August	  2017,	  https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/30/us/politics/us-­‐‑aid-­‐‑pakistan-­‐‑terror.html?mcubz=0.	  	  46	  K.	  Alan	  Kronstadt	  and	  Susan	  Epstein,	  “Direct	  Over	  U.S.	  Aid	  Appropriations	  for	  and	  Military	  Reimbursements	  to	  Pakistan,	  FY2002-­‐‑FY2018,”	  6	  September	  2017.	  	  47	  The	  roles	  of	  these	  governments	  in	  the	  wars	  in	  Iraq,	  Syria,	  and	  Afghanistan	  is	  described	  in	  Department	  of	  Defense	  Budget	  Justification,	  "Overseas	  Contingency	  Operations,	  Operations	  and	  Maintenance,	  Defense-­‐‑Wide,"	  FY2016,	  http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2016/budget_justification/pdfs/01_Operation_and_Maintenance/O_M_VOL_1_PART_2/DSCA_OCO_OP-­‐‑5.pdf.	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in	  US	  military	  operations."48	  	  As	  noted	  above,	  a	  small	  portion	  of	  US	  operations	  included	  in	  the	   US	   OCO	   budget	   in	   FY2016	   and	   2017	   were	   “Operation	   Odyssey	   Lightening”	   which	  attacked	   the	   Islamic	   State	   in	   Libya.	   These	   operations	  were	   focused	   on	   air	   strikes	   of	   ISIS	  camps.	  	   The	  US	  also	  provides	  security	  assistance	  intended	  to	  counter	  terrorism	  and	  provide	  regime	  stability	  to	  other	  countries	  that	  are	  not	  part	  of	  the	  OCO	  budget.	  Some	  of	  the	  security	  and	  economic	  assistance	  to	  European,	  African	  and	  Central	  American	  countries	   that	   is	  not	  charged	   to	   the	   OCO	   budget	   appears	   instead	   in	   the	   base	   budgets	   of	   the	   Departments	   of	  Defense	  (and	  State).	  However,	  these	  funds	  are	  in	  service	  of	  shoring	  up	  the	  potential	  of	  some	  states	  to	  detect	  threats	  and	  combat	  violent	  extremism.	  	  	   In	   some	   cases,	  military	   and	   foreign	   assistance	   to	   other	   countries	   is	   comparatively	  small	  when	  compared	  to	  other	  spending	  for	  the	  wars,	  and	  this	  report	  has	  not	  included	  this	  spending	  in	  this	  accounting	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  war	  even	  though	  some	  of	  these	  activities	  are	  quite	  significant	  in	  political	  or	  humanitarian	  terms.49	   	  For	  example,	  this	  report	  does	  not	  include	  spending	  on	  Uzbekistan.	  Like	  Pakistan,	  Uzbekistan	  is	  not	  a	  declared	  war	  zone,	  but	  the	  US	  increased	   its	   engagement	   with	   that	   country	   since	   the	   9/11	   attacks.50	   Uzbekistan,	   which	  shares	  a	  border	  with	  Afghanistan,	  has	  supported	  the	  US	  war	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  has	  been	  considered	  an	  important	  partner	  to	  the	  US.51	  Uzbekistan	  allowed	  US	  military	  vehicles	  the	  use	  of	   Uzbekistan	   Khanabad	   airbase	   as	   part	   of	   its	   transportation	   network	   into	   northern	  Afghanistan	  until	  November	  2005	  when	  the	  US	  criticized	  the	  Uzbek	  government	  and	  ceased	  operations	   at	   the	   base.	   Beginning	   in	   2009,	   some	   rail	   and	   air	   transit	   and	   overflight	  permissions	  were	  negotiated	  between	   the	  US,	  NATO	  and	  Uzbekistan.	  Overland	   transit	   to	  Afghanistan	   through	   Uzbekistan	   became	  more	   important	   when	   the	   US	   killed	   two-­‐‑dozen	  Pakistani	  soldiers	  in	  late	  November	  2011	  and	  Pakistan	  halted	  US	  transit	  to	  Afghanistan	  for	  about	  7	  months.	  Military	  aid	  to	  Uzbekistan,	  which	  is	  meant	  to	  secure	  military	  transportation	  access	  to	  roads	  into	  Afghanistan	  (and	  for	  a	  number	  of	  years,	  access	  to	  the	  military	  base	  in	  Karshi-­‐‑Khanabad),	  peaked	  in	  2002,	  and	  has	  totaled	  more	  than	  $200	  million	  through	  FY2017.	  	  The	   Trump	   administration	   requested	   an	   additional	   $840,000	   in	   security	   assistance	   for	  
                                                48	  Department	  of	  Defense	  Budget	  Justification,	  "Overseas	  Contingency	  Operations,	  Operations	  and	  Maintenance,	  Defense-­‐‑Wide,"	  FY2018,	  http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2018/FY18_Green_Book.pdf.	  	  49	  See	  Anita	  Dancs,	  "International	  Assistance	  Spending	  Due	  to	  War	  on	  Terror,"	  Costs	  of	  War,	  June	  2011	  and	  US	  Department	  of	  State	  Congressional	  Budget	  Justifications	  for	  Foreign	  Operations.	  	  Also	  see	  Jim	  Nichol,	  "Uzbekistan:	  Recent	  Developments	  and	  U.S.	  Interests,"	  Congressional	  Research	  Service,	  21	  August	  2013.	  https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21238.pdf.	  	  Also	  see	  the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  State,	  Foreign	  Operations	  Assistance:	  Uzbekistan,	  various	  years,	  http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/.	  50	  Belasco,	  "The	  Cost	  of	  Iraq,	  Afghanistan,	  and	  Other	  Global	  War	  on	  Terror	  Operations	  Since	  9/11,"	  8	  December	  2014,	  p.	  90.	  51	  See,	  for	  instance,	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  Comptroller,	  Overview:	  Overseas	  Contingency	  
Operations	  (June	  2014)	  p.	  8.	  http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2015/amendment/FY2015_Budget_Request_Overview_Book_Amended.pd	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Uzbekistan	   for	  FY2018.52	   In	  early	  2015,	   the	  US	  announced	  that	   it	  would	  send	  Uzbekistan	  military	  equipment	  valued	  at	  hundreds	  of	  millions	  of	  dollars,	  including	  308	  Mine-­‐‑Resistant	  Ambush	  Protected	  Vehicles	  and	  20	  Armored	  Recovery	  Vehicles.53	  	  Similarly,	  also	  outside	  the	  OCO	  budget	  are	  funds	  and	  activities	  underway	  in	  Yemen,	  arguably	  an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Global	  War	  on	  Terror,	  where	  the	  US	  plays	  both	  a	  direct	  and	  indirect	  military	  role.54	  Specifically,	  the	  US	  conducts	  drone	  and	  other	  air	  strikes	  in	  Yemen	  against	  militant	  organizations,	  including	  Al	  Qaeda	  in	  the	  Arabian	  Peninsula	  (AQAP)	  and	  the	  much	  smaller	  branch	  of	  ISIS	  —	  more	  than	  200	  strikes	  since	  2002	  —	  and	  has	  supported	  the	  government	  in	  Yemen	  against	  an	  opposition	  force,	  including	  by	  supplying	  the	  Yemeni	  government	  with	  excess	  defense	  articles	  currently	  valued	  at	  about	  $35	  million	  from	  2007	  to	  2012.55	  	  From	  FY2001	  to	  FY2017,	  the	  US	  has	  given	  more	  than	  $830	  million	  to	  Yemen	  for	  security	  assistance,	  and	  the	  Trump	  administration	  has	  requested	  $6.5	  million	  in	  FY2018	  to	   fund	   non-­‐‑proliferation	   and	   anti-­‐‑terrorism	   in	   Yemen.56	   More	   significantly,	   the	   US	   has	  supported	  a	  Saudi	  Arabia-­‐‑led	  coalition,	  which	  is	  playing	  a	  direct	  military	  role	  in	  the	  war	  by	  between	  the	  Yemeni	  government-­‐‑in-­‐‑exile	  and	  opposition	  forces	  by	  conducting	  air	  strikes	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  government.	  Specifically,	  the	  US	  provided	  refueling	  assistance	  to	  Saudi	  Arabia	  and	  weapons	  for	  this	  bombing	  campaign.	  In	  December	  2016,	  after	  the	  Obama	  administration	  became	  concerned	  about	  the	  Saudi	  air	  strikes,	  that	  administration	  had	  halted	  the	  shipment	  of	  some	  weapons	  to	  Saudi	  Arabia	  intended	  for	  the	  war	  in	  Yemen.	  	  In	  April	  2017,	  55	  members	  of	  Congress	  asked	  President	  Trump	  to	  halt	  the	  US	  refueling	  of	  Saudi	  aircraft.57	  The	  Trump	  administration	   instead	   increased	   its	   assistance	   to	   Saudi	  Arabia.	  Only	   after	   Saudi	  Arabia’s	  forces	  bombed	  schools	  and	  a	  hospital	  in	  Yemen	  in	  August	  2017,	  killing	  civilians,	  did	  the	  US	  announce	  it	  was	  reconsidering	  its	  role.58	  On	  September	  27,	  2017,	  four	  members	  of	  Congress	  submitted	  a	  bi-­‐‑partisan	  bill	  to	  end	  US	  military	  assistance	  to	  Saudi	  Arabia’s	  war	  in	  Yemen.59	  
                                                52	  Security	  Assistance	  Monitor,	  Data	  for	  Uzbekistan,	  http://securityassistance.org/data/program/military/Uzbekistan/2001/2018/all/Global//.	  	  Accessed	  1	  October	  2017.	  53	  Navbahor	  Imamova,	  "Exclusive:	  U.S.	  Gives	  Uzbekistan	  Military	  Equipment	  Boost,"	  Voice	  of	  America,	  22	  January	  2015,	  http://www.voanews.com/content/exclusive-­‐‑us-­‐‑gives-­‐‑uzbekistan-­‐‑military-­‐‑equipment-­‐‑boost/2609433.html.	  Uzbekistan	  is	  an	  authoritarian	  state	  that	  has	  raised	  flags	  in	  Congress	  as	  a	  notorious	  human	  rights	  violator.	  In	  July	  2015,	  Congressman	  Jim	  McGovern	  of	  Massachusetts	  asked,	  "Could	  somebody	  explain	  the	  rationale	  for	  the	  initiative,	  given	  Uzbekistan’s	  human	  rights	  record?"	  Quoted	  in	  Casey	  Michel,	  "Washington's	  Military	  Gift	  to	  Uzbekistan	  Questioned,"	  The	  Diplomat,	  9	  July	  2015,	  http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/washingtons-­‐‑military-­‐‑gift-­‐‑to-­‐‑uzbekistan-­‐‑questioned/.	  54	  Yemen	  received	  US	  support	  through	  the	  Counterterrorism	  Partnership	  Fund.	  55	  Calculated	  from	  the	  Excess	  Defense	  Articles	  (EDA)	  Database,	  http://www.dsca.mil/programs/excess-­‐‑defense-­‐‑articles-­‐‑eda.	  56	  Security	  Assistance	  Monitor,	  Data	  for	  Yemen,	  http://securityassistance.org/data/program/military/Yemen/2001/2018/all/Global//.	  Accessed	  1	  October	  2017.	  57	  Mirren	  Gidda,	  “U.S.	  Considering	  More	  Military	  Assistance	  for	  Saudi	  Arabia	  in	  Yemen’s	  Civil	  War,”	  Newsweek,	  20	  April	  2017,	  http://www.newsweek.com/yemen-­‐‑civil-­‐‑war-­‐‑us-­‐‑saudi-­‐‑arabia-­‐‑airstrikes-­‐‑houthi-­‐‑rebels-­‐‑587018.	  	  58	  Steve	  Visser,	  “U.S.	  Military	  Distances	  itself	  from	  Saudi-­‐‑led	  War	  in	  Yemen,”	  CNN,	  20	  August	  2016,	  http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/20/middleeast/us-­‐‑military-­‐‑yemen-­‐‑saudi-­‐‑led-­‐‑coalition/index.html.	  	  59	  Dan	  De	  Luce,	  “Lawmakers	  Demand	  U.S.	  Withdrawal	  From	  Saudi-­‐‑Led	  War	  in	  Yemen,”	  Foreign	  Policy,	  28	  September	  2017,	  http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/28/lawmakers-­‐‑demand-­‐‑u-­‐‑s-­‐‑withdrawal-­‐‑from-­‐‑saudi-­‐‑led-­‐‑war-­‐‑in-­‐‑yemen/.	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The	  numbers	  involved	  in	  Yemen	  are	  small,	  compared	  to	  spending	  on	  the	  Iraq	  and	  Afghan	  wars.	   	   Yet,	   the	  United	  Nations	  has	   called	   the	   situation	   in	  Yemen	  urgent,	   documenting	   an	  unfolding	   humanitarian	   disaster	  where	   “an	   alarming	   20.7	  million	   people	   in	   Yemen	   need	  some	  kind	  of	  humanitarian	  or	  protection	  support,	  with	  some	  9.8	  million	   in	  acute	  need	  of	  assistance.”60	  
	  
Additional	  War-­‐‑Related	  Spending	  in	  the	  Department	  of	  Defense	  Base	  Budget	  
	  The	  Department	  of	  Defense	  "base,"	  or	  non-­‐‑emergency,	  budget	  includes	  spending	  for	  the	  procurement	  of	  new	  weapons,	  military	  construction,	  the	  health	  care	  and	  pay	  of	  active	  duty	  soldiers,	  operations	  that	  are	  not	  war,	  and	  maintenance.	  Items	  in	  the	  base	  budget	  also	  include	  personnel	  pay	  and	  benefits	  for	  the	  civilians	  who	  work	  for	  the	  Pentagon	  and	  funding	  for	  military	  bases.	  	  The	  base	  budget	  is	  thus	  much	  larger	  than	  the	  emergency	  or	  OCO	  budget.	  	  Overall	   US	   Pentagon	   spending	  —	   the	   total	   of	   the	   base	   budget	   and	   the	  war	   (OCO)	  budgets	  —	  grew	  after	   9/11.61	   	   In	   FY2001	   the	   entire	  US	  military	   budget	  was	   about	   $316	  billion.	  	  In	  early	  2017,	  the	  Trump	  administration	  asked	  Congress	  for	  more	  money	  for	  military	  spending,	   above	   the	  already	  authorized	  budget.	   In	  FY2017,	   the	  military	  budget	   including	  OCO	  spending	  of	  about	  $583	  billion,	  down	  from	  its	  peak	  in	  FY2010	  of	  $691	  billion.62	   	  The	  Trump	  administration	  request	  for	  increased	  base	  budget	  spending	  in	  2018	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  voted	  upon	  at	  the	  time	  of	  this	  writing.	  	  In	   theory,	  spending	  on	  the	  wars	  and	  the	  base	  budget	  should	  be	  distinct	   from	  each	  other:	  when	  Congress	  declares	  war,	  and	  uses	   the	  power	  of	   the	  purse,	   they	   fund	  a	  war	  as	  distinct	  from	  the	  on-­‐‑going	  operations	  of	  the	  defense	  department.	  Why,	  then,	  is	  a	  portion	  of	  base	  budget	  military	  spending	   in	   this	  estimate	  of	   the	  costs	  of	  war,	  even	   though	  Congress	  makes	  special	  appropriations	  for	  the	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq	  wars	  and	  funds	  the	  base	  budget	  in	  separate	  appropriations?	  	  	  First,	  while	  the	  categories	  and	  the	  items	  included	  and	  excluded	  from	  being	  considered	  OCO	  expenses	  are	  ostensibly	  clear,	  as	  the	  US	  Government	  Accountability	  Office	  (GAO)	  notes,	  there	  is	  some	  fuzziness	  around	  what	  is	  rightfully	  in	  the	  base	  budget	  and	  what	  is	  in	  the	  OCO	  budget	  and,	  in	  practice,	  the	  two	  categories	  are	  related.	  Specifically,	  in	  September	  2010,	  the	  Office	  of	  Management	  and	  Budget	  (OMB)	  issued	  a	  set	  of	  criteria	  for	  OCO	  funding	  requests	  that	  the	  Pentagon	  should	  use,	  defining	  distinct	  categories	  of	  what	  can	  and	  cannot	  be	  included	  in	  requests	  to	  Congress	  for	  OCO	  funding	  (see	  Table	  3).	  	  
	  
                                                60	  United	  Nations	  Office	  for	  the	  Coordination	  of	  Humanitarian	  Affairs,	  http://www.unocha.org/yemen/about-­‐‑ocha-­‐‑yemen.	  Accessed	  29	  September	  2017.	  61	  Winslow	  T.	  Wheeler,	  "Unaccountable:	  Pentagon	  Spending	  on	  the	  Post-­‐‑9/11	  Wars,"	  Costs	  of	  War,	  June	  2011.	  And	  Linda	  Bilmes,	  "The	  Financial	  Legacy	  of	  Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan,"	  Costs	  of	  War,	  March	  2013,	  http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2013/The%20Financial%20Legacy%20of%20Iraq%20and%20Afghanistan.pdf.	  62	  See	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  FY2017	  Budget	  Proposal.	  http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-­‐‑Reports/0217_budget.	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Table	  3.	  	  Examples	  of	  Included	  and	  Excluded	  Items,	  Office	  of	  Management	  and	  Budget	  
Criteria	  for	  Overseas	  Funding	  Requests	  by	  the	  DOD,	  Issued	  in	  September	  2010	  63	  	  
Category	   Inclusion	  (OCO	  Budget)	   Exclusion	  (Base	  Budget)	  Equipment	   Replacement	  of	  losses	  for	  items	  already	  programed	  for	  replacement;	  repair	  to	  original	  capability;	  purchase	  of	  special,	  theater-­‐‑specific	  equipment	  
Acceleration	  of	  equipment	  service	  life	  extension	  programs	  
Aircraft	   Replacement	  for	  Combat	  Losses,	  defined	  as	  losses	  by	  accident	  or	  enemy	  action	  in	  the	  theater	  of	  operations	   	  Training	  Equipment	   Training	  base	  stocks	  of	  specialized,	  theater-­‐‑specific	  equipment	  that	  is	  required	  to	  support	  combat	  operations	  	   Training	  vehicles,	  aircraft,	  ammunition,	  and	  simulators	  Munitions	   Replenishment	  of	  munitions	  expended	  in	  the	  war	  zone	   	  Military	  Construction	   Facilities	  and	  infrastructure	  in	  the	  war	  zone	  directly	  tied	  to	  combat	  operations	   Facilities	  and	  infrastructure	  in	  the	  war	  zone	  that	  is	  “enduring”	  Reset	  of	  Supplies	  and	  Equipment	   In-­‐‑theater	  stocks	  to	  pre-­‐‑war	  levels	   Costs	  for	  reconfiguring	  prepositioned	  stocks	  Operations:	  Support	  Commanders	   Within	  theater,	  incremental	  costs	  to	  support	  commanders,	  including	  Emergency	  Response	  Programs	   	  Operations:	  Transport	   Transport	  of	  personnel,	  equipment,	  and	  supplies	  to,	  from	  and	  within	  the	  war	  zone	   	  Operations:	  Training	   Deployment	  of	  specific	  training	  and	  preparation	  for	  units	  and	  personnel,	  military	  and	  civilian,	  to	  assume	  their	  direct	  missions	  in	  the	  theater	  
	  
Operations:	  Supplies	   Food,	  fuel,	  supplies,	  contracted	  services	  and	  other	  support	   	  Operations:	  Coalition	  Partners	   Operational	  costs	  of	  coalition	  partners	  supporting	  US	  missions	  as	  mutually	  agreed	   	  Personnel:	  	  Pay	  and	  Benefits	   Incremental	  Pay:	  special	  pays	  and	  allowances	  for	  service	  members	  and	  employees,	  and	  allowances	  for	  Reserve	  Component	  personnel	  mobilized	  to	  support	  war	  missions	  
Recruiting	  and	  retention	  bonuses;	  Basic	  pay	  and	  the	  basic	  allowances	  for	  Housing	  and	  Subsistence;	  Family	  support	  initiatives,	  to	  include	  construction	  of	  childcare	  facilities,	  and	  support	  for	  service	  members’	  spouse	  professional	  development	  Personnel:	  Health	   Short	  term	  care	  directly	  related	  to	  combat	   Long	  term	  care	  of	  active	  duty	  Personnel	  injured	  in	  combat	  and	  in	  non-­‐‑combat	  situations	  	  What	   can	   be	   included	   in	   requests	   for	   OCO	   funding	   are	   activities	   in	   particular	  geographic	  areas:	  “Geographic	  areas	  in	  which	  combat	  or	  direct	  combat	  support	  operations	  occur:	   Iraq,	  Afghanistan,	  Pakistan,	  Kazakhstan,	  Tajikistan,	  Kyrgyzstan,	   the	  Horn	  of	  Africa,	  
                                                63	  The	  OMB	  criteria	  are	  reprinted	  in	  Appendix	  B	  of	  Belasco,	  "The	  Cost	  of	  Iraq,	  Afghanistan,	  and	  Other	  Global	  War	  on	  Terror	  Operations	  Since	  9/11,"	  8	  December	  2014,	  pp.	  89-­‐‑92.	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Persian	   Gulf	   and	   Gulf	   nations,	   Arabian	   Sea,	   the	   Indian	   Ocean,	   the	   Philippines,	   and	   other	  countries	  on	  a	  case-­‐‑by-­‐‑case	  basis.”64	  The	  US	  government's	  definitions	  of	  the	  threat	  and	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  wars,	  the	  size	  of	  US	  commitments	  to	  these	  wars	  in	  terms	  of	  numbers	  of	  troops	  and	  equipment,	   and	  what	   counts	  officially	   as	  war	   related	  expenditures	  have	   shifted	  over	  time.	  Yet	  there	  are	  areas	  of	  operation	  or	  spending	  that	  are	  not	  explicitly	  enumerated	  in	  the	  OMB	  criteria	  as	  OCO	  “theaters”	  —	  e.g.	  US	  operations	  in	  Yemen	  or	  in	  support	  of	  Saudi	  Arabia’s	  war	   in	  Yemen.	   	   Further,	   the	  DOD	  has	   admittedly	  put	   some	   items	   in	   the	  OCO	  budget	   that	  should	  not	  be	  there.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  is	  arguable	  that	  while	  some	  expenses	  in	  the	  base	  budget	  are	  not	  operational,	   they	  are	  certainly	  war-­‐‑related,	  such	  as	   the	  short-­‐‑term	  care	  of	  service	  members	  who	  are	  injured	  in	  non-­‐‑combat	  duties	  when	  deployed,	  and	  the	  long-­‐‑term	  care	  of	  service	  members	  injured	  in	  combat	  or	  non-­‐‑combat	  duties.	  Thus,	  the	  GAO	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  Office	  of	  Management	  and	  Budget	  (OMB)	  categories	  need	  revision.65	  	  	   Second,	   and	  more	   significantly,	   the	  effect	  of	   the	  wars	  has	  been	   to	   increase	  overall	  military	   spending.	   Winslow	   Wheeler	   has	   argued	   that,	   prior	   to	   the	   9/11	   attacks,	   the	  Pentagon's	  base	  military	  budget	  was	  not	  expected	  to	  significantly	  increase,	  yet	  after	  the	  war	  it	  did	  grow	  substantially.	  	  Military	  spending	  might	  well	  have	  increased	  after	  2001	  even	  if	  the	  9/11	  attacks	  had	  not	  happened,	  but	  we	  should	  ask:	  How	  much	  of	  the	  unanticipated	  increase	  in	  the	  base	  budget	  is	  due	  to	  the	  wars	  in	  Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan	  and	  the	  larger	  war	  on	  terror?	  	  	   In	  separate	  analyses,	  Linda	  J.	  Bilmes	  and	  Winslow	  Wheeler	  have	  estimated	  that	  tens	  of	  billions	  of	  dollars	  in	  extra	  spending	  in	  the	  Pentagon's	  base	  budget	  are	  due	  to	  the	  wars	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq.	  Wheeler	  attributes	  much	  of	  the	  increase	  to	  the	  war	  climate,	  namely	  the	  desire	  of	  the	  administration	  and	  members	  of	  Congress	  to	  show	  support	  for	  the	  troops	  in	  the	   form	   of	   higher	   pay	   and	   modernization	   of	   military	   equipment.	   Bilmes	   suggests	   that	  increases	   to	   the	   Pentagon	   base	   budget	   are	   in	   part	   due	   to	  military	   pay	   increases	   used	   to	  bolster	  military	  recruitment	  when	  it	  was	  lagging	  during	  the	  Iraq	  War	  –	  pay	  increases	  which	  she	   argues	   are	   unlikely	   to	   be	   reduced	   after	   the	   wars'	   end.	   Bilmes	   argues	   that	   medical	  expenses	   of	   active	   duty	   personnel	   have	   grown	   due	   to	   the	   increasing	   utilization	   rates	   by	  active	   duty	   troops	   and	   their	   families,	   the	   expansion	   of	   the	   TRICARE	   medical	   insurance	  program,	  and	   the	  more	  complicated	  medical	  needs	  of	   active	  duty	   soldiers	   injured	  during	  their	  deployments.	  Similarly,	  short	  term	  health	  care	  expenses	  directly	  related	  to	  combat	  are	  part	  of	  the	  OCO	  budget,	  but	  longer	  term	  needs	  and	  the	  infrastructure	  to	  provide	  for	  health	  care	  of	  soldiers	  who	  have	  deployed	  to	  the	  war	  zones	  are	  not	  in	  the	  OCO	  budget.66	  	  In	  FY2001,	  appropriations	  for	  Military	  Personnel	  and	  the	  Defense	  Health	  program	  totaled	  $91	  billion;	  in	  FY2015,	  those	  programs	  were	  budgeted	  to	  cost	  $160	  billion.67	  In	  addition,	  the	  number	  of	  civilians	  employed	  by	  the	  Pentagon	  is	  larger	  than	  in	  the	  past,	  and	  has	  tended	  to	  grow	  even	  
                                                64	  Criterial	  are	  reprinted	  in	  Appendix	  B	  of	  Amy	  Belasco,	  "The	  Cost	  of	  Iraq,	  Afghanistan,	  and	  Other	  Global	  War	  on	  Terror	  Operations	  Since	  9/11,"	  Congressional	  Research	  Service	  (CRS)	  8	  December	  2014,	  pp.	  89-­‐‑92.	  65	  United	  States	  Government	  Accountability	  Office,	  “Overseas	  Contingency	  Operations:	  OMB	  and	  DOD	  Should	  Revise	  the	  Criteria	  for	  Determining	  Eligible	  Costs	  and	  Identify	  Costs	  Likely	  to	  Endure	  Long	  Term,”	  January	  2017.	  http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/682158.pdf.	  	  	  66	  See	  Appendix	  B	  in	  Belasco,	  "The	  Cost	  of	  Iraq,	  Afghanistan,	  and	  Other	  Global	  War	  on	  Terror	  Operations	  Since	  9/11,"	  2014	  pp.	  89-­‐‑92.	  67	  Office	  of	  the	  Undersecretary	  of	  Defense,	  Comptroller,	  Defense	  Budget	  Overview	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  
Defense,	  Fiscal	  Year	  2017	  Budget	  Request,	  February	  2016,	  p.	  6-­‐‑2.	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as	  spending	  on	  the	  wars	  declines.	  In	  2014,	  the	  Department	  of	  Defense	  had	  about	  723,400	  civilian	   employees;	   in	   2017,	   the	  Department	   of	  Defense	   employed	   an	   estimated	   730,000	  employees	  and	  was	  projected	  to	  have	  740,000	  employees	  by	  2018.68	  	  	  When	  war	  spending	  declines,	  one	  would	  expect	  base	  budget	  spending	  to	  decline	  at	  about	  the	  same	  rate.	  While	  fluctuations	  in	  base	  and	  war	  spending	  do	  track	  each	  other	  in	  some	  years,	  notably	  in	  fiscal	  years	  2004-­‐‑2008,	  and	  2010,	  in	  some	  years,	  the	  two	  budgets	  are	  out	  of	  sync.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  with	  a	  few	  exceptions,	  even	  when	  war	  spending	  declined,	  for	  example	  between	   FY2011	   and	   FY2016,	   the	   annual	   Department	   of	   Defense	   base	   budget	   remained	  around	  $500	  billion.	  While	  there	  are	  other	  possible	  explanations	  for	  the	  relative	  stability	  of	  the	  DOD	  budget,	  this	  report	  suggests	  that	  this	  reflects	  both	  the	  fact	  that	  some	  War	  on	  Terror	  missions	  have	  been	  normalized	  into	  the	  base	  budget	  and	  that	  base	  budget	  military	  spending	  has	  been	  inflated	  by	  the	  overall	  climate	  of	  war.	  Thus,	  Figures	  4	  and	  5,	  below,	  illustrate	  the	  trends	  in	  war	  and	  base	  budget	  spending	  by	  the	  DOD,	  the	  institutionalization	  of	  higher	  base	  budget	  spending,	  and	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  base	  budget	  to	  decline	  at	  the	  same	  rate	  as	  emergency	  OCO	  funding,	  which	  peaked	  in	  2008.69	  	  
Figure	  4.	  Trends	  in	  Department	  of	  Defense	  (DOD)	  Authorizations	  for	  Overseas	  
Contingency	  Operations	  (OCO)	  and	  Base	  Budget,	  FY2001-­‐‑2018	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Figure	  5.	  Percent	  Change	  in	  Overseas	  Contingency	  Operations	  (OCO)	  and	  the	  Base	  
Budgets,	  over	  the	  Previous	  Year's	  Budget,	  FY2003	  to	  FY201871	  
	  
	  	  	  	   Perhaps	   largely	  due	  to	  the	  duration	  and	  pace	  of	  military	  operations,	  health	  care	   is	  consuming	  a	  large	  portion	  of	  the	  Pentagon’s	  base	  budget.	  This	  is	  in	  part	  because	  active	  duty	  soldiers	  have	  also	  been	  wounded	  in	  these	  wars,	  or	  have	  suffered	  other	  injuries	  related	  to	  their	  deployments	  and	   these	   soldiers	  often	   require	  on-­‐‑going	  care.	  For	   instance,	   about	  16	  percent	   of	   service	  members	  who	   have	   suffered	  major	   limb	   amputations	   in	   the	   Iraq	   and	  Afghanistan	  wars	  have	  returned	  to	  active	  duty.	  This	  is	  a	  much	  higher	  rate	  of	  return	  to	  service	  for	  these	  amputees	  than	  in	  previous	  wars,	  and	  these	  individuals	  have	  on-­‐‑going	  medical	  care	  associated	  with,	  for	  example,	  fitting	  new	  prostheses	  as	  they	  are	  needed.72	  	  Further,	  there	  is	  a	  higher	  rate	  in	  these	  wars	  of	  what	  are	  known	  as	  “late”	  combat	  related	  limb	  amputations	  —	  those	  that	  occur	  sometimes	  many	  months	  or	  several	  years	  after	  a	  soldier	  has	  sustained	  the	  initial	   injury.73	   	  Other,	   less	  dramatic,	  musculoskeletal	   injuries	  may	  also	  require	   long	  term	  care.74	   As	   a	   consequence	   of	   increased	   spending	   on	   active	   duty	   soldier’s	   health	   care,	   the	  Pentagon	   has	   tried	   to	   cut	   costs	   of	   the	   TRICARE	   medical	   insurance	   program	   including	  
                                                71	  Calculated	  using	  the	  numbers	  in	  the	  previous	  table.	  72	  Daniel	  J.	  Stinner,	  Travic	  C.	  Burns,	  Kevin	  L.	  Kurk,	  and	  James	  R.	  Ficke,	  “Return	  to	  Duty	  Rate	  of	  Amputee	  Soldiers	  in	  the	  Current	  Conflicts	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq,”	  The	  Journal	  of	  Trauma:	  Injury,	  Infection	  and	  Critical	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increasing	   co-­‐‑pay	   amounts.75	  But	   the	   spending	   for	  healthcare	  of	   active	  duty	   soldiers	   and	  their	  dependents	  will	  likely	  remain	  significant	  unless	  the	  system	  is	  completely	  overhauled.	  These	  factors	  will	  keep	  military	  spending	  on	  healthcare	  high.	  	  The	   overall	   war	   climate	   affects	   the	   willingness	   of	   Congress	   to	   make	   cuts	   in	   the	  Pentagon’s	  budget.	  For	  instance,	  Congress	  has	  been	  unwilling	  to	  close	  even	  those	  bases	  that	  the	  Pentagon	  has	  said	  it	  does	  not	  need.	  	  The	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  under	  both	  Presidents	  Obama	  and	  Trump,	  has	  also	  requested	  that	  Congress	  allow	  it	  to	  close	  some	  military	  bases	  that	   it	  does	  not	  need	   in	  a	  new	  Base	  Realignment	  and	  Closure	  process.	   In	  2016,	  Pentagon	  officials	  estimated	  that	  they	  had	  22	  percent	  excess	  infrastructure	  capacity,	  and	  that	  closing	  excess	   bases	   would	   save	   more	   than	   $2	   billion	   in	   annual	   recurring	   savings.76	   As	   of	   yet,	  Congress	  has	  not	  acted	  on	  this	  request.77	  	  The	  US	  military	   budget	   in	   FY2017	   and	   FY2018	   included	   a	   Request	   for	   Additional	  Appropriations	  (RAA)	  meant	  to	  “address	  immediate	  warfighting	  readiness	  and	  shortfalls.”78	  Some	  of	  the	  funds	  requested	  are	  intended	  to	  “restore	  key	  munitions	  inventories”	  and	  other	  items	  that	  are	  directly	  and	  indirectly	  related	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  US	  has	  been	  at	  war	  for	  16	  years.	  	   In	  summary,	  some	  costs	  of	  the	  post-­‐‑9/11	  wars	  have	  become	  institutionalized	  in	  the	  Pentagon’s	  base	  budget	   in	   the	   form	  of	   increased	  weapons	  procurement,	   health	   care,	   and	  active	  duty	  pay.	   	  Even	  though	  these	  costs	  are	  not	  part	  of	  the	  official	  expenses	  that	  can	  be	  charged	  to	  the	  OCO	  according	  to	  OMB	  criteria,	  the	  perceived	  need	  to	  spend	  on	  these	  items	  would	  arguably	  not	  have	  risen	  as	  much	  or	  as	  quickly	  had	  the	  US	  been	  at	  peace.	  	  Further,	  there	  is	  little	  willingness	  in	  Congress	  to	  cut	  military	  spending,	  even	  on	  very	  expensive	  items	  that	  the	  Pentagon	  has	  said	  it	  does	  not	  want	  or	  need,	  since	  the	  9/11	  attacks.79	  The	  Pentagon	  has	  had	  little	  reason	  to	  exercise	  budgetary	  discipline	  in	  a	  war	  climate.	  	  
Homeland	  Security	  Missions	  	  One	  of	   the	   largest	  ongoing	  counterterror	  war-­‐‑related	  costs	   that	  occurs	  outside	  the	  Defense	  and	  State	  Department	  Overseas	  Contingency	  Operations	  budgets	  is	  associated	  with	  
                                                75	  For	  a	  summary,	  see	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  Comptroller,	  “Defense	  Budget	  Overview,”	  FY	  2018	  Budget	  Request,	  pp.	  5-­‐‑4	  -­‐‑5-­‐‑5.	  http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2018/fy2018_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.	  	  76	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  "Department	  of	  Defense	  Infrastructure	  Capacity,"	  March	  2016.	  http://democrats-­‐‑armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=48FF2A32-­‐‑DB43-­‐‑4AB7-­‐‑92EC-­‐‑138A6D50C2D7.	  	  	  77	  See	  Joe	  Gould	  and	  Aaron	  Mehta,	  "Pentagon	  to	  Congress:	  We	  Need	  Base	  Closures,"	  Defense	  News,	  15	  April	  2016,	  http://defensenews.com/story/defense/2016/04/15/pentagon-­‐‑requests-­‐‑brac/83082038/.	  Scott	  Maucione,	  “DoD	  Tries	  to	  Calm	  Congress	  Over	  New	  BRAC	  Request,”	  Federal	  News	  Radio,	  8	  June	  2017,	  https://federalnewsradio.com/brac/2017/06/dod-­‐‑tries-­‐‑to-­‐‑calm-­‐‑congress-­‐‑over-­‐‑new-­‐‑brac-­‐‑request/.	  	  78	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  Comptroller,	  “Defense	  Budget	  Overview,”	  FY	  2018	  Budget	  Request,	  pp.	  1-­‐‑1	  -­‐‑1-­‐‑2.	  79	  See	  Lauren	  Chadwick	  and	  R.	  Jeffrey	  Smith,	  "Congress	  Funds	  Problematic	  Weapons	  the	  Pentagon	  Does	  Not	  Want,"	  Center	  for	  Public	  Integrity,	  5	  July	  2016,	  https://www.publicintegrity.org/2016/07/05/19869/congress-­‐‑funds-­‐‑problematic-­‐‑weapons-­‐‑pentagon-­‐‑does-­‐‑not-­‐‑want.	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Homeland	   Security	   spending	   dedicated	   to	   diminishing	   the	   risks	   and	   potential	   effects	   of	  terrorism	  and	  to	  responding	  to	  acts	  of	  terrorism	  should	  they	  occur.	  	  Created	   in	   2002,	   the	   Department	   of	   Homeland	   Security	   (DHS)	   performs	   many	  missions	  previously	  undertaken	  by	  a	  diverse	  array	  of	  government	  agencies.	  For	  instance,	  the	  Federal	  Emergency	  Management	  Agency,	  the	  Coast	  Guard,	  Customs	  and	  Border	  Protection,	  and	   the	   Secret	   Service	   operate	   within	   the	   DHS.	   In	   addition,	   DHS	   is	   in	   charge	   of	  Transportation	  Safety	  Administration	  and	  Immigration	  and	  Customs	  Enforcement.	  The	  DHS	  has	  a	  number	  of	  responsibilities,	   in	  conjunction	  with	  other	  agencies,	  that	  are	  directly	  and	  indirectly	  war	  related.	  These	  missions	  include	  “preventing	  and	  disrupting	  terrorist	  attacks,”	  “protecting	   critical	   infrastructure,”	   and	   “responding	   and	   recovering	   from	   terrorist	  incidents.”80	   These	   homeland	   security	   missions	   include	   appropriations	   to	   several	  departments	  that	  are	  not	  included	  in	  the	  OCO	  budget,	  including	  the	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  Department	  of	  Transportation,	  and	  the	  Department	  of	  State.	   	  Since	  2002,	  more	  than	  $780	  billion	  has	  been	  appropriated	  for	  these	  missions.81	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  6.	  Spending	  for	  Homeland	  Security	  Missions	  Related	  to	  War,	  FY2002-­‐‑FY2017	  
(Billions	  of	  Current	  Dollars)82	  	  
	  	  
                                                80	  The	  budget	  for	  these	  missions	  is	  shared	  among	  several	  agencies,	  including	  the	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  so	  it	  is	  clearer	  to	  report	  on	  the	  mission,	  rather	  than	  the	  DHS	  budget	  per	  se.	  	  	  81	  See	  Anita	  Dancs,	  "Homeland	  Security	  Spending	  Since	  9/11,"	  June	  2011,	  Costs	  of	  War,	  http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2011/Homeland%20Security.pdf;	  Office	  of	  Management	  and	  Budget,	  Analytical	  Perspectives:	  Budget	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Government,	  Fiscal	  Year	  2017	  (Washington,	  DC:	  U.S.	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  2016)	  and	  previous	  years.	  	  For	  instance,	  https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/budget/Analytical_Perspectives.	  In	  the	  FY	  2017	  Analytical	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This	  total	  does	  not	  include	  spending	  for	  FY2018	  for	  those	  missions.	  The	  White	  House	  and	   the	  Department	  of	  Homeland	  Security	  have	  recently	  stopped	  reporting	   the	  details	  of	  requests	  and	  spending	  on	  homeland	  security	  missions.	  Specifically,	  the	  White	  House	  Office	  of	  Management	  and	  Budget	  stated	  in	  its	  most	  recent	  Analytical	  Perspectives	  on	  the	  budget	  that,	   “Previous	   Analytical	   Perspectives	   volumes	   included	   a	   ‘Homeland	   Security	   Funding	  Analysis’	  chapter,	  and	  provided	  additional	  detailed	  information	  on	  the	  Internet	  address	  cited	  above	  and	  on	  the	  Budget	  CD-­‐‑ROM.	  P.L.	  115-­‐‑31	  that	  eliminated	  the	  statutory	  requirement	  for	  this	  information.	  Therefore,	  this	  information	  is	  not	  included	  in	  this	  years'	  Budget	  and	  it	  will	  not	  be	  included	  in	  future	  Budgets.”83	  	  It	  is	  unclear	  why	  this	  change	  was	  made.	  However,	  this	  lack	   of	   transparency	   will	   certainly	   make	   estimating	   the	   costs	   of	   Homeland	   Security	  specifically	  dedicated	  to	  the	  GWOT	  more	  difficult.84	  
	  
Veterans	  Care	  
	   The	  number	  of	  Global	  War	  on	  Terror	  service	  members	  in	  the	  Department	  of	  Veterans	  Affairs	  (VA)	  system	  has	  grown	  to	  nearly	  two	  million	  people.	  Of	  these,	  as	  of	  FY2016,	  more	  than	  one	  million	  people	  were	  receiving	  compensation	  for	  disability.	  In	  the	  VA’s	  report	  of	  May	  2014,	  the	  VA	  said	  that	  it	  is	  currently	  providing	  health	  care	  to	  more	  than	  858,000	  veterans	  of	  the	  post-­‐‑9/11	  wars	  (which	  the	  VA	  calls	  the	  Global	  War	  on	  Terror	  (GWOT)).85	  The	  VA	  noted	  
                                                83	  Office	  of	  Management	  and	  Budget,	  Analytical	  Perspectives:	  Budget	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Government,	  Fiscal	  Year	  2018	  (Washington,	  DC:	  U.S.	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  2017)	  p.	  4.	  https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Analytical_Perspectives.	  	  84	  	  	  In	  the	  FY2017	  Analytical	  Perspectives,	  which	  still	  included	  a	  chapter	  on	  Homeland	  Security,	  the	  discussion	  notes	  several	  changes	  in	  accounting.	  These	  changes	  amount	  to	  reductions	  in	  what	  was	  spent	  by	  the	  Department	  of	  Defense	  for	  Homeland	  Security,	  but	  not	  on	  what	  was	  appropriated.	  Homeland	  Security	  spending	  was	  recalculated	  in	  the	  Office	  of	  Management	  and	  Budget,	  Analytical	  Perspectives:	  Budget	  of	  the	  U.S.	  
Government,	  Fiscal	  Year	  2017,	  p.	  347.	  Specifically:	  	  “As	  reported	  in	  the	  Fiscal	  Year	  2016	  President’s	  budget,	  DOD	  refined	  its	  characterization	  of	  homeland	  security-­‐‑	  related	  activities	  to	  report	  its	  spending	  for	  this	  purpose	  more	  accurately.	  This	  effort	  resulted	  in	  an	  approximately	  $4	  billion	  reduction	  in	  estimated	  homeland	  security	  funding	  for	  DOD	  relative	  to	  what	  was	  previously	  estimated	  for	  2014,	  for	  example.	  The	  majority	  of	  this	  reduction	  is	  related	  to	  lower	  estimated	  Army	  National	  Guard	  and	  Reserve	  personnel	  costs	  due	  to	  a	  more	  accurate	  allocation	  methodology	  for	  estimating	  National	  Guardsmen	  and	  Reservist	  assignments.	  The	  composition	  of	  these	  assignments	  changed	  due	  to	  troop	  withdrawal	  from	  Afghanistan	  and	  associated	  reductions	  in	  manpower	  required	  for	  pre-­‐‑deployment	  training	  and	  backfilling	  troops	  who	  were	  deployed.	  In	  addition,	  DOD	  previously	  included	  some	  activities	  focused	  outside	  of	  the	  continental	  United	  States,	  which	  have	  been	  removed	  from	  current	  homeland	  security	  estimates.	  Examples	  include	  overseas	  activities	  by	  the	  Special	  Operations	  Command	  related	  to	  counterterrorism	  and	  Marine	  Corps	  activities	  related	  to	  countering	  improvised	  explosive	  devices.	  DOD	  and	  OMB	  worked	  together	  to	  restate	  past	  estimates	  using	  the	  refined	  methodology.	  The	  results	  of	  this	  effort	  are	  shown	  in	  Table	  22-­‐‑10.	  	  During	  this	  effort,	  DOD	  also	  identified	  adjustments	  necessary	  to	  maintain	  consistency	  throughout	  the	  database.	  DOD	  determined	  that	  the	  funding	  methodology	  used	  prior	  to	  Fiscal	  Year	  2012	  to	  account	  for	  Protecting	  Infrastructure	  and	  Critical	  Key	  Assets	  (PICKA)	  was	  different	  than	  the	  current	  methodology.	  DOD	  previously	  included	  funding	  for	  both	  domestic	  and	  select	  international	  activities	  as	  PICKA.	  In	  this	  revision,	  DOD	  normalized	  the	  historical	  data	  to	  reflect	  the	  current	  practice	  of	  reporting	  only	  the	  United	  States-­‐‑based	  portion	  of	  those	  activities	  related	  to	  DOD’s	  homeland	  security	  mission.	  DOD	  is	  still	  reporting	  the	  same	  programs	  over	  the	  Fiscal	  Year	  2004-­‐‑2017	  period;	  however,	  this	  revision	  provides	  a	  better	  accounting	  of	  the	  estimated	  homeland	  security	  funding	  within	  those	  programs	  prior	  to	  Fiscal	  Year	  2012.	  Therefore,	  to	  allow	  data	  comparisons,	  DOD	  re-­‐‑	  stated	  PICKA	  funding	  data	  for	  the	  Fiscal	  Year	  2004-­‐‑2011	  period,	  as	  shown	  in	  the	  other	  adjustments	  row.	  	  Further	  adjustments	  were	  also	  required	  to	  correct	  Prior	  Year	  and	  Budget	  Year	  2012	  data	  entry	  errors.	  Net	  corrections	  of	  these	  errors	  are	  shown	  in	  the	  Fiscal	  Year	  2012	  column	  in	  the	  other	  adjustments	  row.”	  85	  Department	  of	  Veterans	  Affairs,	  News	  Release,	  23	  May	  2017.	  https://www.va.gov/budget/docs/summary/fy2018VAsBudgetPressRelease.pdf.	  And	  see:	  Department	  of	  Veteran’s	  Affairs,	  Budget,	  Vol.	  II,	  https://www.va.gov/budget/docs/summary/fy2018VAbudgetVolumeIImedicalProgramsAndInformationTechnology.pdf,	  p.	  184.	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in	   May	   2017	   that	   the	   “Operation	   Enduring	   Freedom,	   Iraqi	   Freedom,	   New	   Dawn,	   and	  Operation	  Inherent	  Resolve,	  Veterans	  and	  services	  are	  up	  215	  percent	  for	  2010.”86	  	  The	  Department	  of	  Veterans	  Affairs	  has	  been	  under-­‐‑capacity	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  influx	  of	  new	  veterans	  who	  are	  eligible	  for	  services	  and	  it	  has	  had	  to	  grow	  its	  staffing	  levels	  very	  quickly	  —	  doubling	  in	  size	  since	  2001	  to	  an	  estimated	  356,000	  workers	  in	  2017	  —	  to	  manage	  these	  veterans'	  care	  and	  to	  reduce	  a	   large	  backlog	  in	  processing	  claims	  for	  disability.	  The	  backlog	  has	  declined,	  and	  the	  number	  of	  VA	  staff	  is	  projected	  to	  grow	  over	  the	  next	  several	  years.	   The	   Department	   of	   Veterans	   Affairs	   will	   increase	   to	   an	   estimated	   approximately	  364,000	  workers	  in	  2018.	  
	  
Table	  4.	  Estimated	  Veterans	  Spending,	  FY	  2001-­‐‑201787	  
	  
Additional	  War	  Related	  Spending	  
Cumulative	  Total	  
$Billions	  VA	  Medical88	   42.4	  Social	  Security	  Disability89	   7.18	  VA	  Disability	  Compensation90	   97.8	  VA	  Other	  Costs	  Related	  to	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq91	   144	  
Total	  	   239.9	  	  Spending	  for	  the	  veterans	  of	  recent	  US	  wars	  includes	  care	  for	  the	  more	  than	  52,000	  US	  soldiers	  who	  were	  officially	  wounded	  in	  action	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq,	  and	  many	  who	  were	  evacuated	  from	  the	  war	  zones	  for	  disease	  or	  non-­‐‑hostile	  injuries	  requiring	  on-­‐‑going	  medical	  care	  either	  by	  the	  Department	  of	  Veterans	  Affairs	  or	  the	  Department	  of	  Defense	  if	  they	  remain	  in	  service.	  	  More	  than	  1,600	  soldiers	  who	  fought	  in	  the	  post-­‐‑9/11	  wars	  Iraq	  or	  Afghanistan	   have	   had	   battle-­‐‑injury	   major	   limb	   amputations	   as	   of	   late	   2015.92	   	   In	   2016,	  
                                                86	  Department	  of	  Veterans	  Affairs,	  FY2018	  President’s	  Budget	  Request	  Briefing,	  23	  May	  2017,	  https://www.va.gov/budget/docs/summary/fy2018VAsBudgetRolloutBriefing.pdf.	  	  87	  This	  estimate	  assumes	  that	  reductions	  spending	  under	  the	  Budget	  Control	  Act	  and	  increases	  in	  demand	  will	  yield	  expenditures	  that	  are	  about	  the	  same	  between	  FY2013	  and	  FY2018.	  	  	  88	  Bilmes,	  "The	  Financial	  Legacy	  of	  Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan":	  VA	  medical	  including	  direct	  outlays	  for	  Iraq/Afghanistan	  veterans	  +	  directly	  related	  medical	  costs	  related	  to:	  Traumatic	  Brain	  Injury;	  Spinal	  injury;	  Women	  veterans.	  	  And	  author’s	  estimates	  for	  FY2015-­‐‑FY2017.	  89	  Bilmes,	  "The	  Financial	  Legacy	  of	  Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan,"	  Disability	  Pay	  for	  fully	  disabled	  veterans	  (90-­‐‑100%)	  service-­‐‑connected.	  And	  author’s	  estimates	  for	  FY2015-­‐‑FY2017.	  90	  For	  FY2016	  the	  Department	  of	  Veterans	  Affairs	  reports	  on	  “Compensation”	  for	  Service	  Connected	  Disability	  or	  Death	  Benefits.	  https://www.benefits.va.gov/REPORTS/abr/ABR-­‐‑Compensation-­‐‑FY16-­‐‑0613017.pdf.	  The	  FY2017	  is	  not	  yet	  concluded.	  	  This	  report	  estimates	  that	  compensation	  will	  be	  about	  the	  same	  for	  Fiscal	  Year	  2017	  as	  it	  was	  for	  FY2016,	  which	  was	  $16.86	  billion.	  That	  is	  of	  course	  a	  conservative	  estimate	  since	  the	  number	  of	  veterans	  deemed	  for	  disability	  compensation	  will	  likely	  grow.	  	  91	  Bilmes,	  "The	  Financial	  Legacy	  of	  Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan,"	  Other	  VA	  costs	  directly	  related	  to	  Iraq/Afghanistan,	  including	  investments	  in:	  	  Claims	  processing	  for	  new	  claims;	  Mental	  health/PTSD;	  IT	  investment	  related	  to	  claims;	  Prosthetics;	  Readjustment	  Counseling	  for	  new	  veterans.	  92	  See	  Hannah	  Fischer,	  "A	  Guide	  to	  U.S.	  Military	  Casualty	  Statistics:	  Operations	  Freedom's	  Sentinel,	  Operation	  Inherent	  Resolve,	  Operation	  New	  Dawn,	  Operation	  Iraqi	  Freedom,	  and	  Operation	  Enduring	  Freedom,"	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thankfully,	  there	  were	  no	  major	  limb	  amputations	  in	  either	  war	  zone.93	  The	  veterans	  of	  these	  wars	  also	  suffer	  from	  skeletal	  injury,	  PTSD,	  and	  Traumatic	  Brain	  Injury	  at	  rates	  higher	  than	  the	  veterans	  of	  other	  wars.	  	  More	  than	  327,000	  GWOT	  veterans	  have	  been	  diagnosed	  with	  Traumatic	  Brain	  Injury	  as	  of	  August	  2017.94	  And	  of	  course,	  not	  all	  injuries	  are	  immediately	  diagnosed	  –	  the	  VA	  will	  be	  offering	  services	  to	  former	  soldiers	  for	  years	  to	  come.	  	  	   The	  numbers	  of	  GWOT	  veterans	  receiving	  disability	  payments	  is	  rapidly	  growing.	  	  In	  2016,	  the	  most	  recent	  year	  for	  which	  there	  are	  figures,	  the	  VA	  added	  87,669	  new	  disability	  compensation	  recipients	   to	   their	  rolls.95	   	  Of	   those	  veterans	  of	   the	  GWOT	  whose	  disability	  claims	  had	  been	  processed	  by	  the	  VA	  in	  2016,	  again,	  the	  most	  recent	  year	  for	  which	  there	  are	  figures,	  more	  than	  1	  million	  GWOT	  veterans	  now	  receive	  some	  disability	  compensation	  from	  the	  VA.	  Of	  the	  total	  number	  of	  Veterans	  receiving	  disability	  compensation	  payments,	  more	  than	   874,600	   veterans	   were	   classified	   as	   30	   percent	   or	  more	   disabled.96	   Some	   disabled	  veterans	  also	  receive	  Social	  Security	  Disability	  payments,	  as	  noted	  in	  Table	  3.	  
	  
Figure	  6.	  Number	  of	  Veterans	  Receiving	  Compensation	  for	  Disability	  in	  FY201697	  
	  
                                                Congressional	  Research	  Service,	  7	  August	  2015.	  https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22452.pdf.	  Also	  see	  Catherine	  Lutz,	  "U.S.	  and	  Coalition	  Casualties	  in	  Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan,"	  for	  Costs	  of	  War,	  21	  February	  2013.	  	  FOIA	  requests	  show	  90,000	  medivacs.	  Bilmes,	  "The	  Financial	  Legacy	  of	  Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan."	  Costs	  of	  War.	  93	  Military	  Health	  System	  and	  Defense	  Health	  Agency,	  Armed	  Forces	  Health	  Surveillance	  Branch,	  “2016	  Marks	  First	  Year	  of	  Zero	  Combat	  Amputations	  Since	  the	  Start	  of	  the	  Afghan,	  Iraq	  Wars,”	  28	  March	  2017,	  https://health.mil/News/Articles/2017/03/28/2016-­‐‑marks-­‐‑first-­‐‑year-­‐‑of-­‐‑zero-­‐‑combat-­‐‑amputations-­‐‑since-­‐‑the-­‐‑start-­‐‑of-­‐‑the-­‐‑Afghan-­‐‑Iraq-­‐‑wars.	  	  94	  Fischer,	  "A	  Guide	  to	  U.S.	  Military	  Casualty	  Statistics,"	  2015,	  p.	  4.	  95	  Figure	  based	  on	  data	  from	  the	  Department	  of	  Veterans	  Affairs,	  Veterans	  Benefits	  Administration,	  Annual	  
Benefits	  Report,	  Fiscal	  Year	  2016,	  Updated	  February	  2017,	  “Compensation,”	  p.	  21.	  https://www.benefits.va.gov/REPORTS/abr/ABR-­‐‑Compensation-­‐‑FY16-­‐‑0613017.pdf.	  96	  Department	  of	  Veterans	  Affairs,	  Veterans	  Benefits	  Administration,	  Annual	  Benefits	  Report,	  Fiscal	  Year	  2016,	  Updated	  February	  2017,	  “Compensation,”	  p.	  22.	  https://www.benefits.va.gov/REPORTS/abr/ABR-­‐‑Compensation-­‐‑FY16-­‐‑0613017.pdf.	  	  97	  Figure	  based	  on	  Data	  in	  the	  Department	  of	  Veterans	  Affairs,	  Veterans	  Benefits	  Administration,	  Annual	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This	  report	  has	  not	  made	  estimates	  for	  the	  total	  economic	  costs	  and	  consequences	  of	  the	  harm	  to	  soldiers	  and	  the	  admitted	  state	  of	  overwhelm	  that	  the	  Department	  of	  Veterans	  Affairs	  has	  faced	  for	  more	  than	  15	  years.	  As	  Michael	  Baker	  has	  argued	  in	  Military	  Medicine,	  “direct	  costs	  of	  treatment	  are	  only	  a	  fraction	  of	  the	  total	  costs	  related	  to	  mental	  health	  and	  cognitive	  conditions.	  Far	  higher	  are	   the	   long-­‐‑term	  individual	  and	  societal	  costs	  stemming	  from	  lost	  productivity,	  reduced	  quality	  of	   life,	   family	  disruptions,	  homelessness,	   impaired	  health,	  substance	  abuse,	  and	  suicide.”98	  Further,	  this	  report	  has	  not	  counted	  the	  costs	  of	  other	  VA	  benefits	  for	  which	  Global	  War	  on	  Terror	  veterans	  are	  eligible.	  For	  instance,	  Global	  War	  on	  Terror	  veterans	  are	  eligible	  for	  significant	  educational	  and	  mortgage	  benefits.	  The	  VA's	  Home	  Loan	  Guarantee	  Program	  has	  already	  served	  more	  than	  600,000	  veterans	  at	  a	  cost	  of	  more	  than	  $206	  billion	  as	  of	  late	  2014.99	  More	  than	  815,000	  GWOT	  veterans	  have	  so	  far	  received	  educational	  benefits	  under	  programs	  that	  were	  already	  in	  place	  or	  which	  have	  been	  created	  specifically	  for	  post-­‐‑9/11	  veterans.100	  
	  
Future	  Military	  and	  Veterans-­‐‑Related	  Spending	  
	  There	   are	   two	   major	   categories	   of	   future	   war-­‐‑related	   spending	   included	   in	   this	  estimate	   —	   costs	   for	   the	   ongoing	   care	   of	   veterans	   and	   continuing	   appropriations	   for	  Overseas	  Contingency	  Operations.	  	  We	  cannot	  say	  when	  the	  wars	  will	  end,	  and	  thus	  only	  the	  projected	   costs	   through	   FY2018	   are	   included;	   we	   can	   say	   that	   the	   costs	   for	   the	   care	   of	  veterans	  will	  continue	  after	  the	  wars	  end.	  	  Total	   costs	   for	   the	   GWOT	   veterans	   will	   increase	   over	   time.	   For	   every	   war,	   peak	  spending	  on	  veterans'	  disability	  and	  medical	  care	  occurs	  decades	  after	  their	  service	  ends.101	  For	   instance,	   the	   costs	   for	  World	  War	   I	   veterans	   peaked	   in	   1969,	   and	   for	  World	  War	   II	  veterans	  in	  1986.	  Costs	  for	  the	  care	  of	  Vietnam	  War	  veterans	  has	  not	  yet	  peaked.102	  Similarly,	  the	  medical	  costs	  of	  veterans	  of	  the	  US	  post-­‐‑9/11	  wars	  have	  not	  come	  close	  to	  peaking.	  As	  Michael	  Baker	  has	  reported	  in	  Military	  Medicine,	  “The	  costs	  of	  caring	  for	  veterans	  appears	  to	  peak	  30	  to	  40	  years	  or	  longer	  following	  the	  conflict	  because	  of	  age-­‐‑related	  chronic	  disease	  overlying	  the	  initial	  costs	  of	  care	  are	  likely	  to	  escalate	  exponentially	  compared	  to	  prior	  wars	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  reasons:	  (1)	  there	  is	  enhanced	  survival	  of	  devastating	  injuries	  not	  seen	  in	  previous	  conflicts;	  (2)	  better	  health	  care	  has	  resulted	  in	  longer	  life	  spans;	  and	  (3)	  there	  are	  
                                                98	  Michael	  S.	  Baker,	  “Casualties	  of	  the	  Global	  War	  on	  Terror	  and	  Their	  Future	  Impact,”	  Military	  Medicine,	  vol.	  179,	  no.	  4	  (April	  2014)	  pp.	  348-­‐‑355:	  352.	  99	  While	  these	  mortgages	  are	  short	  term	  costs,	  over	  the	  long	  run,	  most	  of	  those	  mortgages	  will	  be	  paid	  back,	  with	  interest.	  Veterans	  may	  also	  be	  eligible	  for	  Specially	  Adapted	  Housing	  (SAH)	  and	  Special	  Housing	  Adaptation	  (SHA)	  grants	  so	  that	  they	  may	  modify	  their	  home	  to	  take	  account	  of	  their	  service	  connected	  disabilities	  including	  loss	  of	  or	  loss	  of	  use	  of	  limbs.	  100	  As	  of	  mid	  2014.	  Department	  of	  Veterans	  Affairs,	  "VA	  Benefits	  Activity,	  Veterans	  Deployed	  to	  the	  Global	  War	  on	  Terror,	  VBA	  Data	  Through	  Jun	  2014,	  DMDC	  Data	  Through	  May	  2014,"	  pp.	  7-­‐‑8.	  101	  Institute	  of	  Medicine	  of	  the	  National	  Academies	  (hereafter,	  Institute	  of	  Medicine),	  Returning	  Home	  from	  
Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan:	  Assessment	  of	  Readjustment	  Needs	  of	  Veterans,	  Service	  Members,	  and	  their	  Families	  (Washington,	  DC:	  The	  National	  Academies	  Press,	  2013)	  p.	  3.	  102	  Bilmes,	  "The	  Financial	  Legacy	  of	  Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan."	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more	  expensive	  diagnostic	  and	  therapeutic	  tools,	  treatments,	  and	  prosthetics	  that	  did	  not	  exist	  for	  veterans	  of	  previous	  conflicts.”103	  	  	  	  The	  costs	  for	  veterans	  of	  the	  post-­‐‑9/11	  wars	  will	  be	  comparatively	  greater	  than	  for	  past	  wars.	  One	   reason	   is	  because	   the	  veterans	  of	   the	  wars	   in	   Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan	  often	  return	  with	  multiple	   traumas	   as	  well	   as	   respiratory	   and	   cardiac	   trouble	  which	  may	   take	  some	  years	  after	  deployment	  to	  emerge.104	  This	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  estimate	  the	  future	  costs	  of	   veteran's	   care	   and	   disability	   benefits	   based	   on	   past	   wars;	   GWOT	   veterans	   have	   been	  making	  more	  claims	  for	  injury	  and	  illness	  than	  the	  veterans	  of	  previous	  wars,	  and	  they	  have	  higher	   rates	   of	   service	   connected	   disability	   than	   the	   veterans	   of	   previous	   US	   wars.105	  	  Further,	   as	   each	   veteran	   ages,	   their	   health	   care	   needs	   will	   become	   more	   complex	   and	  expensive.	  A	  2015	  survey	  of	  all	  post-­‐‑9/11	  veterans	  found	  that	  about	  74	  percent	  were	  under	  the	  age	  of	  45.106	  	  In	  2013,	  Linda	  Bilmes	  estimated	  that	  of	  those	  veterans	  who	  have	  been	  discharged,	  to	  that	  point,	  their	  care	  over	  the	  next	  forty	  years	  would	  cost	  approximately	  $836	  billion	  through	  2053.	  	   	  
Table	  5.	  Bilmes’	  2013	  Estimate	  of	  Future	  Obligations	  for	  Veterans'	  Care	  	  
FY2014-­‐‑2053107	  
Categories	  of	  Veterans'	  Care	  
Present	  Value	  2014-­‐‑
2053	  Department	  of	  Veterans	  Affairs	  Medical	   287.6	  Social	  Security	  Disability	   42.3	  Department	  of	  Veterans	  Affairs	  Disability	   419.7	  VA	  Related	   86.6	  
Total	  	   836.2	  	  	   In	  June	  2014,	  Bilmes	  updated	  her	  estimate	  of	  future	  spending	  on	  veterans	  care	  and	  projected	   that	   through	  2054	  Net	  Present	  Value	  costs	   for	  veterans	  disability,	  medical,	  and	  associated	  costs	  of	  administration	  for	  care	  of	  veterans	  will	  be	  more	  than	  $1	  trillion	  because	  the	   rate	   and	   complexity	   of	   medical	   and	   disability	   claims	   had	   been	   higher	   than	   Bilmes	  originally	  predicted.108	  	  "In	  addition,	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  veteran's	  claims	  are	  now	  being	  
                                                103	  Baker,	  “Casualties	  of	  the	  Global	  War	  on	  Terror	  and	  Their	  Future	  Impact,”	  p.	  352.	  104	  Commission	  on	  Care,	  Final	  Report	  of	  the	  Commission	  on	  Care	  (Washington,	  DC:	  30	  June	  2016),	  p.	  166.	  105	  Department	  of	  Veterans	  Affairs,	  National	  Center	  for	  Veterans	  Analysis	  and	  Statistics,	  "	  Profile	  of	  Post-­‐‑/11	  Veterans:	  2014,"	  May	  2016,	  p.	  10.	  http://www.va.gov/vetdata/docs/SpecialReports/Post_911_Veterans_Profile_2014.pdf.	  106	  Source:	  US	  Census	  Bureau,	  American	  Community	  Survey,	  cited	  in	  the	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  Veterans	  Affairs,	  “Profile	  of	  Post-­‐‑9/11	  Veterans:	  2015,”	  March	  2017,	  https://www.va.gov/vetdata/docs/SpecialReports/Post_911_Veterans_Profile_2015.pdf.	  	  p.	  6.	  107	  Long	  Term	  Present	  Value	  of	  Medical	  Care,	  Social	  Security,	  and	  Disability	  Claims	  already	  submitted	  through	  2014-­‐‑2053.	  Bilmes,	  "The	  Financial	  Legacy	  of	  Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan."	  	  	  108	  Bilmes	  in	  email	  communication	  with	  the	  author,	  25	  June	  2014.	  Also	  see	  Bilmes,	  "A	  Trust	  Fund	  for	  Veterans."	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appealed,	  adding	  to	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  process	  and	  in	  most	  cases,	  resulting	  in	  higher	  awards	  for	  veterans."109	   As	   the	   US	   continues	   to	   fight	   in	   Iraq	   and	   Afghanistan,	   service	   members’	  deployments	   have	   been	   extended	   far	   beyond	  what	  was	   projected.	   This	  will	   increase	   the	  numbers	  of	  veterans	  with	  service	  in	  those	  wars	  who	  are	  eligible	  for	  VA	  services.	  In	  2015,	  the	  VA	  noted	  that	  it	  expected	  the	  post-­‐‑9/11	  veteran	  population	  to	  increase	  33	  percent	  between	  2015	  and	  2020.110	  	  	  In	   2016	   alone,	   more	   than	   87,000	   GWOT	   veterans	   became	   new	   disability	  compensation	   recipients.	   Also	   in	   2016,	   the	  Department	   of	   Defense	   diagnosed	  more	   than	  18,000	  service	  members	  “worldwide”	  with	  Traumatic	  Brain	  Injuries.	  Of	  those,	  the	  majority	  were	  mild	  TBI.	  But	  there	  were	  88	  Penetrating,	  171	  Severe,	  and	  2,546	  Moderate	  traumatic	  brain	  injuries.111	  Similarly,	   in	  the	  first	  two	  quarters	  of	  2017,	  8,924	  service	  members	  were	  diagnosed	   with	   TBI.	   Of	   those,	   23	   were	   classed	   as	   Penetrating,	   55	   Severe,	   and	   1,159	  Moderate.112	   	   These	   statistics	   include	   soldiers	   who	   were	   not	   deployed;	   however,	   the	  incidence	  rate	  of	  soldiers	  who	  were	  deployed,	  or	  within	  30	  days	  of	  return,	  was	  1.5	   times	  higher	  over	  the	  16	  years	  from	  2001	  to	  2016	  than	  for	  those	  never	  deployed	  to	  a	  war	  zone.113	  Most	  of	   those	  soldiers	  with	  TBI	  will	   likely	  become	  patients	   treated	  by	   the	  Department	  of	  Veterans	  Affairs	  and	  some	  number	  of	  them	  will	  be	  eligible	  for	  disability	  compensation.	  Thus,	  nearly	  all	  estimates	  of	  the	  future	  costs	  of	  caring	  for	  veterans	  are	  probably	  low.	  	  	   As	   Bilmes	   reminds	   us,	   even	   though	   the	   Department	   of	   Veterans	   Affairs	   has	   "the	  fastest-­‐‑growing	   budget	   in	   the	   federal	   government,"	   the	   department	   "still	   lacks	   sufficient	  funding	  to	  fill	  thousands	  of	  vacancies	  for	  doctors	  and	  nurses	  and	  to	  finance	  badly	  needed	  repairs	  to	  its	  hospitals	  and	  clinics."114	  Long	  wait	  times	  for	  services	  have	  been	  a	  persistent	  barrier	  for	  veterans'	  access	  to	  health	  care,	  and	  ultimately	  may	  increase	  the	  costs	  of	  care.115	  	  	  	  In	  sum,	  this	  report’s	  estimate	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  caring	  for	  veterans	  in	  the	  future	  takes	  into	  account	  the	  growing	  number	  of	  veterans	  entering	  the	  system	  due	  to	  the	  longer	  duration	  of	   the	  wars.	   It	   is	   likely	  an	  underestimate	  of	   the	   final	  costs	  because	  more	  Iraq	  and	  Afghan	  soldiers	  will	  enter	  the	  VA	  system	  over	  the	  next	  several	  years	  as	  the	  wars	  continue,	  and	  the	  
                                                109	  Bilmes	  in	  email	  communication	  with	  the	  author,	  17	  August	  2016.	  110	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  Veterans	  Affairs,	  “Profile	  of	  Post-­‐‑9/11	  Veterans:	  2015,”	  p.	  12.	  111	  DOD	  Numbers	  for	  Traumatic	  Brain	  Injury:	  World	  Wide	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  Department	  of	  Defense	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  Brain	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  of	  10	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  112	  DOD	  Numbers	  for	  Traumatic	  Brain	  Injury:	  World	  Wide	  Totals,	  Department	  of	  Defense	  and	  Veterans	  Brain	  Injury	  Center,	  as	  of	  10	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  2017,	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  Defense	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  patients	  once,	  from	  their	  first	  encounter,	  and	  according	  to	  the	  most	  severe	  diagnosis.	  E.g.	  if	  someone	  is	  diagnosed	  in	  2015	  with	  mild	  TBI,	  but	  they	  sustain	  another	  injury	  or	  are	  later	  diagnosed,	  say	  in	  2017	  with	  moderate	  TBI,	  the	  diagnosis	  date	  remains	  2015,	  but	  the	  diagnosis	  is	  classed	  moderate.	  	  113	  Military	  Health	  System	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  Institute	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costs	  of	  administration	  and	  services	  for	  the	  veterans	  of	  the	  wars	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq	  will	  grow	  accordingly.	  The	  estimate	  of	  $1	  trillion	  in	  costs	  for	  veterans’	  medical	  care	  and	  disability	  through	  2056	  is	  thus	  conservative.	  
	  
Macroeconomic,	  Non-­‐‑Budgetary	  and	  Externalized	  Costs	  	  
Macro-­‐‑economic	  Costs	  	  Earlier	  Costs	  of	  War	  Project	  analysis	  by	  Heidi	  Garrett-­‐‑Peltier,	  James	  Heintz,	  and	  Ryan	  Edwards	  showed	  that	  the	  wars	  likely	  cost	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  jobs,	  affected	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  US	  to	  invest	  in	  infrastructure,	  and	  probably	  led	  to	  increased	  interest	  costs	  on	  borrowing,	  not	  to	   mention	   greater	   overall	   federal	   indebtedness.116	   Military	   spending	   is	   much	   less	  productive	  of	  jobs	  than	  spending	  on	  other	  sectors	  of	  the	  economy.	  	  As	  Garret-­‐‑Peltier	  writes,	  “each	  $1	  million	  of	  spending	  on	  defense	  creates	  5.8	  jobs	  directly	  in	  defense	  industries	  and	  1.1	  jobs	  in	  the	  supply	  chain,	  for	  a	  total	  of	  6.9	  jobs	  per	  $1	  million	  of	  federal	  defense	  spending.	  In	  comparison,	  spending	  that	  same	  amount	  in	  wind	  or	  solar	  energy	  creates	  a	  total	  of	  8.4	  or	  9.5	   jobs,	   respectively.	  Energy	  efficiency	  retrofits	   create	  10.6	   jobs	  per	  $1	  million,	  which	   is	  more	  than	  50	  percent	  above	  the	  level	  of	  job	  creation	  supported	  by	  military	  spending.	  General	  infrastructure,	  which	  here	  includes	  street/highway/tunnel/bridge	  construction	  as	  well	  as	  new	  and	  repair	  construction	  of	  schools	  and	  other	  non-­‐‑residential	  buildings,	  creates	  over	  40	  percent	   more	   jobs	   than	   the	   military,	   with	   a	   total	   multiplier	   of	   9.8	   jobs	   per	   $1	   million	  spending.”117	   She	   concludes	   that	   “If	   we	   look	   at	   the	   average	   job	   creation	   potential	   of	  healthcare,	   education,	   clean	   energy,	   and	   infrastructure,	   $230	   billion	   could	   have	   created	  about	   2.8	  million	   jobs	   instead	   of	   the	   1.5	  million	   created	   through	  war	   spending,	   thus	   the	  average	  opportunity	  cost	  is	  about	  1.3	  million	  jobs	  annually.”118	  	   Most	  worrisome,	  perhaps,	   is	   that,	  unlike	  past	  wars,	   the	  post-­‐‑9/11	  wars	  have	  been	  funded,	  from	  the	  beginning,	  primarily	  by	  borrowing.	  In	  simple	  terms,	  the	  US	  started	  FY2001	  with	  a	  budget	  surplus.	  The	  US	  went	   into	  deficit	  spending	   in	  2002	  and	  has	  not	  balanced	  a	  budget	  since	  then.	  No	  additional	  taxes	  have	  been	  raised	  for	  these	  wars;	  indeed,	  taxes	  were	  cut	  in	  many	  categories	  for	  most	  of	  the	  war	  years,	  and	  they	  recently	  rose	  only	  for	  households	  with	   incomes	   over	   $400,000	   and	   only	   in	   recent	   years.	   Using	   a	   standard	  macroeconomic	  model	   of	   the	   US	   economy,	   Ryan	   Edwards	   estimates	   that	   as	   of	   2017,	   the	   US	   has	   already	  incurred	  an	  additional	  approximately	  $534	  billion	  in	  interest	  on	  borrowing	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  wars.119	  Over	  the	  next	  several	  decades,	  assuming	  (in	  theory)	  no	  more	  military	  spending	  on	  these	  wars,	  but	  also	  no	  additional	  tax	  increases	  or	  spending	  cuts,	  cumulated	  interest	  costs	  
on	  borrowing	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  wars	  will	  ultimately	  rise	  to	  dwarf	  the	  $1.5	  trillion	  of	  direct	  
military	   spending	   from	   2001-­‐‑2013,	   adding	  more	   than	   $7.9	   trillion	   to	   the	   national	  
                                                116	  See	  respectively,	  research	  briefs	  by	  Heidi	  Garrett-­‐‑Peltier,	  "The	  Job	  Opportunity	  Costs	  of	  War,"	  Costs	  of	  War,	  24	  May	  2017;	  James	  Heintz,	  "Military	  Assets	  and	  Public	  Investment,"	  Costs	  of	  War	  June	  2011,	  and	  Ryan	  D.	  Edwards,	  “Post-­‐‑9/11	  War	  Spending,	  Debt,	  and	  the	  Macroeconomy,”	  Costs	  of	  War,	  June	  2011.	  	  117	  Garrett-­‐‑Peltier,	  "The	  Job	  Opportunity	  Costs	  of	  War,"	  p.	  3.	  118	  Garrett-­‐‑Peltier,	  "The	  Job	  Opportunity	  Costs	  of	  War,"	  p.	  5.	  119	  Edwards	  calibrates	  a	  standard	  Solow	  model	  to	  model	  feedbacks	  from	  deficit-­‐‑financed	  government	  defense	  spending	  into	  current	  GDP,	  the	  capital	  stock,	  and	  interest	  rates.	  See	  Edwards,	  “Post-­‐‑9/11	  War	  Spending,	  Debt,	  and	  the	  Macroeconomy.”	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debt.120	  Thus,	  even	   if	  military	  spending	  plateaus,	   interest	  costs	  will	   far	  surpass	   total	  war	  costs	  unless	  Congress	  devises	  another	  plan	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  wars.	  	  The	  severity	  of	   the	  burden	  of	  war-­‐‑related	   interest	  payments	  will	  depend	  on	  many	  factors,	  not	   least,	   the	  overall	   future	  health	  of	   the	  US	  economy,	   interest	  rates,	  government	  fiscal	  policy,	  and	  national	  savings.	  But	   in	   the	  past,	  unfinanced	  war	  spending	  has	  played	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  raising	  the	  US	  national	  debt,	  and	  it	  has	  few	  of	  the	  benefits	  associated	  with	  other	   sources	  of	  debt,	   such	  as	   reductions	   in	   taxes	   and	   increases	   in	   spending	   intended	   to	  combat	  the	  recession	  of	  2008-­‐‑2009	  that	  have	  also	  raised	  the	  debt.	  	  	  	  
Externalized	  Costs	  	  
	   Some	  of	   the	  costs	  of	   the	  wars	   in	   Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan	  have	  been	  externalized	  and	  therefore	  do	  not	  appear	   in	   this	  accounting	   focused	  on	  US	   federal	  outlays	  and	  obligations.	  There	  are	  many	  costs	  for	  veterans’	  care	  borne	  by	  families,	  state	  and	  local	  governments,	  and	  nongovernmental	  associations.	  Specifically,	  as	  Zoe	  Wool's	  2013	  Costs	  of	  War	  paper	  shows,	  the	  externalized	  costs	  include	  the	  social	  costs	  of	  care	  for	  disabled	  veterans	  borne	  by	  their	  families.121	  Americans	  have	  generously	  helped	  each	  other	  and	  many	  family	  members	  take	  on	  the	  burden	  of	  care.	  Linda	  Bilmes	  estimated	  in	  2011	  that	  the	  costs	  to	  US	  military	  families	  of	  the	  uncompensated	  expenses	  of	  caring	  for	  injured	  family	  members	  may	  be	  as	  much	  as	  $300-­‐‑400	  billion	  over	  the	  next	  several	  decades.	  122	  More	  recently,	  a	  2014	  RAND	  Corporation	  Study,	  
Hidden	  Heroes,	  estimated	  that	  post-­‐‑9/11	  caregivers	  were	  providing	  a	  “yearly	  value”	  of	  $3	  billion	  in	  care,	  suggesting	  that	  Bilmes’	  estimate	  was	  quite	  conservative.123	  The	  RAND	  study	  also	  found	  that	  many	  caregiver’s	  mental	  and	  physical	  health	  were	  directly	  affected	  by	  the	  burden	   of	   caregiving;	   in	   fact,	   post-­‐‑9/11	   caregivers	   suffered	   at	   higher	   rates	   than	   the	  caregivers	  of	  other	  veterans.124	  	  	   Further,	  state	  and	  local	  governments	  assume	  some	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  veterans	  care	  and	  benefits.125	  In	  addition,	  other	  costs	  of	  caring	  for	  Afghan	  and	  Iraq	  war	  veterans	  has	  been	  taken	  up	   by	   non-­‐‑governmental	   organizations.	   For	   example,	   as	   of	   September	   2017,	   more	   than	  
                                                120	  Edward's	  calculation	  is	  based	  on	  only	  the	  direct	  war	  appropriations	  noted	  in	  table	  2	  for	  DoD	  and	  State	  Department.	  121	  Zoë	  H.	  Wool,	  "The	  War	  Comes	  Home:	  Institutionalizing	  Informal	  Care	  and	  the	  Family	  Consequences	  of	  Combat	  Injuries,"	  Costs	  of	  War,	  February	  2013.	  122	  Linda	  J.	  Bilmes,	  "Current	  and	  Projected	  Future	  Costs	  of	  Caring	  for	  Veterans	  of	  the	  Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan	  Wars,"	  Costs	  of	  War	  June	  2011.	  	  Alison	  Howell	  and	  Zoë	  H.	  Wool,	  "The	  War	  Comes	  Home:	  The	  Toll	  of	  War	  and	  The	  Shifting	  Burden	  of	  Care,"	  Costs	  of	  War	  June	  2011	  and	  Zoë	  H.	  Wool,	  "The	  War	  Comes	  Home:	  Institutionalizing	  Informal	  Care	  and	  the	  Family	  Sequelae	  of	  Combat	  Injuries,"	  Costs	  of	  War	  February	  2013.	  123	  Rajeev	  Ramchand,	  Terri	  Tenielian,	  et	  al,	  Hidden	  Heroes:	  America’s	  Military	  Caregivers	  (Santa	  Monica:	  RAND	  Corporation,	  2014),	  p.	  122.	  124	  Rajeev	  Ramchand,	  Terri	  Tenielian,	  et	  al,	  Hidden	  Heroes.	  	  125	  See	  Brian	  Smith,	  "The	  Cost	  of	  Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan	  Veterans'	  Care	  to	  Texas,"	  3	  January	  2015,	  http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2015/The%20Cost%20of%20Iraq%20and%20Afghanistan%20Veterans%27%20Care%20to%20Texas.pdf;	  Luke	  Lattanzi-­‐‑Silveus,	  "Costs	  of	  the	  Wars	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq	  for	  the	  State	  of	  Rhode	  Island,"	  1	  January	  2015,	  http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2015/Costs%20of%20the%20Wars%20in%20Afghanistan%20and%20Iraq%20for%20the%20State%20of%20Rhode%20Island.pdf.	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100,000	   post-­‐‑9/11	   veterans	   and	   service	   members	   have	   been	   helped	   by	   the	   Wounded	  Warrior	  Project,	  which	  provides	  support	  for	  veterans’	  physical	  and	  mental	  health.126	  	   Each	  one	  of	  the	  nearly	  7,000	  US	  soldiers	  killed	  by	  wars	  in	  Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan	  could	  be	  assigned	  a	  statistical	  value	  of	  human	  life	  —	  a	  dollar	  value	  to	  their	  deaths.	  	  The	  Costs	  of	  War	  Project	  has	  not	  estimated	  the	  economic	  impact	  on	  the	  United	  States	  economy	  —	  the	  loss	  of	  economic	  productivity	  —	  of	  the	  deaths	  and	  injuries	  of	  US	  service	  members	  due	  to	  the	  wars.	  	  	  
The	   economic	   costs	   of	   the	   war	   for	   other	   countries	   are	   also	   not	   included	   in	   this	  
accounting.	  The	  costs	  incurred	  outside	  the	  US	  by	  its	  allies	  and	  by	  the	  people	  and	  governments	  of	   Afghanistan,	   Pakistan,	   and	   Iraq	   total	   in	   the	  many	   billions	   of	   dollars.	   For	   example,	   the	  disruption	   caused	   by	   war	   to	   Iraq's	   health	   care	   and	   economic	   infrastructure	   has	   led	   to	  continued	  adverse	  health	  effects	  and	  a	  devastating	  economic	  burden	  for	  the	  people	  of	  Iraq	  and	  the	  region.	  The	  same	  can	  be	  said	  of	  the	  wars	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  Pakistan.	   	  There	  are	  millions	  of	  refugees	  created	  by	  the	  wars,	  the	  burden	  of	  whose	  care	  has	  fallen	  to	  international	  humanitarian	  organizations	  and	  host	  countries.	  	  The	   United	   Kingdom	   spent	   about	   $14	   billion	   in	   Iraq	   from	   2003-­‐‑2011	   and	   was	  projected	   to	   spend	   about	   $30	   billion	   in	   Afghanistan	   by	   the	   time	   of	   its	   complete	  withdrawal.127	  	  By	  one	  estimate	  published	  in	  2011,	  the	  budgetary	  costs	  of	  German	  military	  involvement	  in	  Afghanistan	  is	  more	  than	  $15	  billion	  (12	  billion	  Euros),	  at	  the	  low	  end,	  and	  this	  number	  does	  not	  include	  medical	  costs,	  or	  the	  interest	  costs	  of	   financing	  the	  German	  participation	  in	  the	  war.128	  	  While	  the	  US	  has	  assisted	  the	  governments	  of	  Afghanistan,	  Pakistan,	  and	  Iraq,	  there	  are	  still	  likely	  hundreds	  of	  billions	  of	  dollars	  worth	  of	  reconstruction	  and	  military	  costs	  borne	  by	   those	   governments.	   	   Further,	   there	   is	   also	   increased	   military	   spending	   in	   Pakistan	  (beyond	  what	  the	  US	  has	  given	  in	  military	  aid).	  	  While	  the	  US	  does	  provide	  some	  money	  to	  the	  victims	  of	  war	  in	  Pakistan	  through	  USAID	  Civilian	  Victim	  Support	  Program	  grants,	  local	  governments	   in	   Pakistan,	   especially	   in	   Balochistan	   and	   Kyber	   Paktunkhwa,	   provide	  assistance	  to	  civilian	  victims	  of	  conflict	  and	  terrorism.129	  	  	  	  In	  addition,	  there	  is	  a	  budgetary	  burden	  to	  international	  organizations’	  involvement	  in	  humanitarian	  assistance	  in	  the	  war	  zones	  which	  is	  shared	  broadly	  by	  many	  of	  the	  world's	  governments.	   This	   burden	   includes	   the	   costs	   of	  work	   by	   UN	   agencies,	   nongovernmental	  
                                                126	  Wounded	  Warrior	  Project,	  https://www.woundedwarriorproject.org/mission/who-­‐‑we-­‐‑serve	  127	  BBC,	  "Iraq	  War	  in	  Figures,"	  14	  December	  2011,	  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-­‐‑middle-­‐‑east-­‐‑11107739.	  James	  Kirkup,	  "Afghan	  War	  Will	  Costs	  British	  Taxpayers	  £20	  billion	  by	  Time	  Mission	  is	  Complete,	  
The	  Telegraph	  19	  May	  2012,	  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/9275712/Afghan-­‐‑war-­‐‑will-­‐‑cost-­‐‑British-­‐‑
taxpayers-­‐‑20-­‐‑billion-­‐‑by-­‐‑time-­‐‑mission-­‐‑is-­‐‑complete.html.	  128	  Tilman	  Brück,	  Olaf	  J.	  de	  Groot,	  and	  Friedrich	  Schneider,	  "The	  Economic	  Costs	  of	  the	  German	  Participation	  in	  the	  Afghanistan	  War,"	  Journal	  of	  Peace	  Research,	  (November	  2011)	  vo.	  48,	  no.	  6,	  pp.	  793-­‐‑805.	  129	  See	  Open	  Society	  Foundations,	  "After	  the	  Dead	  are	  Counted:	  U.S.	  and	  Pakistani	  Responsibilities	  for	  Victims	  of	  Drone	  Strikes,"	  2014,	  pp.	  22-­‐‑23.	  https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/after-­‐‑dead-­‐‑are-­‐‑counted-­‐‑20141120.pdf.	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organizations,	  humanitarian	  organizations	  such	  as	  the	  International	  Committee	  for	  the	  Red	  Cross	   and	   Handicap	   International,	   and	   regional	   governments	   that	   care	   for	   refugees	   and	  displaced	  people	  in	  the	  war	  zones.	  	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  	  	   By	  this	  comprehensive	  yet	  conservative	  estimate,	  the	  wars	  in	  Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan	  have	  cost	  and	  will	  cost	  more	  than	  $5	  trillion	  for	  the	  US,	  including	  for	  future	  veterans’	  care	  and	   for	   the	  President's	   request	   for	  FY2018	  Overseas	  Contingency	  Operations.	   It	   does	  not	  
include	  all	  future	  interest	  on	  debt	  associated	  with	  the	  wars,	  which	  will	  likely	  be	  many	  trillions	  of	  dollars.	  Table	  6	  is	  a	  more	  detailed	  a	  breakdown	  of	  the	  categories	  of	  costs,	  with	  potential	  future	  interest	  costs	  in	  the	  last	  line	  as	  a	  separate	  entry.	  
	  
Table	  6.	  Detailed	  Summary	  Estimate	  of	  Costs	  to	  Date	  and	  Future	  Costs	  of	  Wars,	  
Rounded	  to	  the	  Nearest	  $Billion130	  
Appropriations	  and	  Expenditures	  FY2001-­‐‑FY2017	  Costs	   $Billion	  1.	  Total	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  all	  OCO	   1,758	  2.	  Total	  State	  Department	  and	  US/AID,	  all	  OCO	   120	  3.	  Estimated	  additions	  to	  the	  Pentagon	  "base"	  budget	   879	  4.	  Veterans	  total	  medical	  and	  disability	  	   277	  5.	  Additions	  to	  Homeland	  Security	  	   783	  6.	  Interest	  on	  Pentagon	  War	  Appropriations131	   534	  
Subtotal	  FY2001-­‐‑FY2017	  Costs	   $4,351	  
Estimates	  of	  Future	  Spending	   	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  all	  OCO,	  request	  for	  FY2018132	   67	  Estimated	  increases	  to	  Pentagon	  base	  budget	  due	  to	  war	   33	  State	  Department/USAID,	  all	  OCO,	  request	  for	  FY2018	   3	  Homeland	  Security	  for	  prevention	  and	  response	  to	  terrorism,	  request	  for	  FY2018	   70	  Veterans'	  costs	  for	  medical	  and	  disability,	  FY2018	   20	  Estimated	  Interest	  on	  borrowing	  to	  pay	  for	  wars,	  FY2018	   88	  Future	  Veterans'	  costs	  for	  medical	  and	  disability,	  FY2019-­‐‑2056	   >1,000	  
Subtotal	  Future	  War-­‐‑related	  Spending	   1,	  281	  
Total	  Costs	  to	  Date	  and	  Estimated	  Future	  Federal	  Budget	  Costs	   $5,632	  
	  
Cumulative	  Interest	  through	  2056	  on	  war	  appropriations	  through	  
FY2013133	   >$7,900	  
                                                130	  In	  current	  dollars.	  	  Italics	  indicates	  the	  figure	  is	  based	  on	  a	  budget	  request	  or	  the	  previous	  year’s	  budget	  authority	  or	  the	  likely	  future	  obligation,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  veterans’	  costs.	  131	  As	  estimated	  by	  Ryan	  Edwards,	  and	  rounded	  to	  the	  nearest	  $100	  billion.	  See	  Edwards,	  “Post-­‐‑9/11	  War	  Spending,	  Debt,	  and	  the	  Macroeconomy.”	  132	  Congress	  has	  on	  occasion	  appropriated	  more	  than	  requested	  for	  OCOs.	  133	  As	  estimated	  by	  Ryan	  Edwards,	  and	  rounded	  to	  the	  nearest	  $100	  billion.	  See	  Edwards,	  “Post-­‐‑9/11	  War	  Spending,	  Debt,	  and	  the	  Macroeconomy.”	  As	  noted	  above,	  war	  appropriations	  for	  Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan	  were	  not	  funded	  with	  new	  taxes,	  but	  by	  borrowing.	  This	  adds	  interest	  costs	  war	  to	  spending,	  specifically,	  the	  interest	  costs	  already	  paid,	  and	  future	  interest	  costs.	  The	  severity	  of	  the	  burden	  of	  war-­‐‑related	  interest	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As	  explained	  earlier,	  this	  estimate	  does	  not	  include	  all	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  war	  for	  which	  it	   is	   difficult	   to	   come	   to	   a	   reasonable	   estimate	   or	  which	   are	   smaller	   and/or	   scattered	   in	  various	  federal	  and	  state	  budgets.	  For	  example,	  as	  noted	  above,	  this	  report	  has	  not	  included	  the	  various	  costs	  of	  veterans’	  care	  that	  have	  fallen	  to	  state	  and	  local	  governments,	  or	  costs	  externalized	  to	  military	  families	  and	  Americans	  more	  generally.	  Nor	  has	  this	  report	  included	  an	  estimate	  of	  the	  larger	  and	  longer-­‐‑term	  macro-­‐‑economic	  consequences	  of	  the	  wars.	  	   This	  paper’s	  estimate	  of	  current	  and	  future	  costs	  of	  war	  demonstrates,	  once	  again,	  that	  the	  actual	  costs	  of	  these	  wars	  greatly	  exceeds	  pre-­‐‑war	  and	  early	  projections	  of	  the	  costs	  of	   the	   Iraq	   and	   Afghanistan	   wars.	   Indeed,	   optimistic	   assumptions	   and	   a	   tendency	   to	  underestimate	  and	  undercount	  war	  costs	  have,	   from	  the	  beginning,	  been	  characteristic	  of	  most	  estimates	  of	  the	  budgetary	  costs	  and	  the	  fiscal	  consequences	  of	  these	  wars.	  	  	  	  Nowhere	   is	   the	   optimism	   of	   those	  who	   argued	   that	   the	  wars	  would	   be	   relatively	  inexpensive	   clearer	   than	   in	   the	  estimates	  of	   the	  budgetary	   costs	  of	   the	   Iraq	  war.	   In	  mid-­‐‑September	  2002	  Lawrence	  Lindsey,	  then	  President	  Bush's	  chief	  economic	  adviser,	  estimated	  that	   the	   "upper	  bound"	   costs	  of	  war	  against	   Iraq	  would	  be	  $100	   to	  $200	  billion.	  Overall,	  Lindsey	  suggested	  however	  that,	  "The	  successful	  prosecution	  of	  the	  war	  would	  be	  good	  for	  the	  economy."134	  On	  December	  31,	  2002,	  Mitch	  Daniels,	   then	   the	  director	  of	   the	  Office	  of	  Management	   and	   Budget,	   estimated	   that	   the	   costs	   of	  war	  with	   Iraq	  would	   be	   $50	   to	   60	  billion.135	  	  Daniels	  suggested	  that	  Lindsay's	  estimates	  were	  much	  too	  high,	  although	  neither	  official	  provided	  details	  for	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  estimates.	  There	  were	  other	  pre-­‐‑war	  estimates	  for	  the	  costs	  of	  war	  in	  Iraq.	  For	  instance,	  in	  September	  2002,	  US	  House	  of	  Representatives	  Budget	  Committee	  Democratic	  staff	  estimated	  costs	  of	  $48	  to	  60	  billion,	  assuming	  30	  to	  60	  days	   of	   combat	   and	   a	   2½	  month	   occupation.136	   	   The	   headline	   in	  The	  Wall	   Street	   Journal	  covering	   the	   Congressional	   estimate	   read,	   "Lindsey	   Overestimated	   Costs	   of	   Iraq	   War,	  Democrats	  Say."137	  Later	  in	  2002,	  Yale	  economist	  William	  Nordhaus	  suggested	  a	  nearly	  $2	  Trillion	  cost	  for	  the	  Iraq	  war	  if	  the	  war	  were	  to	  be	  protracted	  and	  difficult.	  He	  argued	  that	  while	  the	  main	  component	  of	  costs	  could	  be	  higher	  oil	  prices	  ($778	  billion),	  a	  long	  war	  could	  cost	  $140	  billion	  in	  direct	  military	  spending	  and	  another	  $615	  billion	  to	  pay	  for	  occupation,	  peacekeeping,	  reconstruction	  and	  nation-­‐‑building,	  and	  humanitarian	  assistance.138	  To	  this,	  Nordhaus	  added	  an	  estimated	  $391	  billion	  in	  negative	  macroeconomic	  consequences.	  The	  most	  comprehensive	  estimate	  of	  the	  long-­‐‑term	  budgetary	  costs	  of	  both	  wars	  —	  including	  direct	  and	  indirect	  spending	  and	  other	  economic	  effects	  —	  is	  The	  Three	  Trillion	  Dollar	  War	  
                                                payments	  will	  depend	  on	  many	  factors,	  not	  least,	  the	  overall	  future	  health	  of	  the	  US	  economy,	  interest	  rates,	  government	  fiscal	  policy,	  and	  national	  saving.	  134	  Lindsey,	  quoted	  in	  Wall	  Street	  Journal,	  15	  September	  2002.	  135	  Elizabeth	  Bumiller,	  "Threats	  and	  Responses:	  The	  Cost;	  White	  House	  Cuts	  Estimates	  of	  Cost	  of	  War	  with	  Iraq,"	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  31	  December	  2002.	  136	  Assessing	  the	  Costs	  of	  Military	  Action	  Against	  Iraq:	  Using	  Desert	  Shield/Desert	  Storm	  as	  Basis	  for	  Estimates,	  An	  Analysis	  by	  the	  House	  Budget	  Committee.	  September	  2002.	  137	  Bob	  Davis,	  "Lindsey	  Overestimated	  Costs	  of	  Iraq	  War,	  Democrats	  Say,"	  The	  Wall	  Street	  Journal,	  24	  September	  2002.	  138	  William	  D.	  Nordhaus,	  "The	  Economic	  Consequences	  of	  a	  War	  with	  Iraq,"	  in	  American	  Academy	  of	  Arts	  and	  Sciences,	  War	  With	  Iraq,	  Costs,	  Consequences,	  and	  Alternatives	  (Cambridge:	  American	  Academy,	  2002)	  pp.	  51-­‐‑86.	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by	  Joseph	  E.	  Stiglitz	  and	  Linda	  J.	  Bilmes.139	  The	  Stiglitz-­‐‑Bilmes	  estimate	  was	  conservative	  in	  many	  respects.	  Not	  including	  the	  increased	  burden	  to	  our	  national	  debt,	  the	  costs	  of	  war	  have	  exceeded	  even	  their	  cautious	  estimates.	  	  	  	  
	   	  
                                                139	  Stiglitz	  and	  Bilmes,	  The	  Three	  Trillion	  Dollar	  War.	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Appendix:	  Differences	  in	  Estimates	  of	  US	  War	  Spending	  
	  This	  appendix	  details	  how	  this	  accounting	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  war	  is	  the	  same	  or	  different	  from	  other	  counts.	  	  	  	  Much	   less	  comprehensive	  accounts	  of	  US	  war	  spending	  are	  available,	   for	  example,	  from	  the	  US	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  which	  counts	  only	  its	  Overseas	  Contingency	  Operations	  spending.140	  In	  its	  FY2018	  “National	  Defense	  Budget	  Estimates,”	  the	  Department	  of	  Defense	  Comptroller	  listed	  OCO	  spending	  for	  FY2001-­‐‑FY2018	  totaling	  $1.75	  Trillion.141	  This	  report’s	  figures	  essentially	  agree	  with	  this	  accounting	  of	  Department	  of	  Defense	  OCO	  spending	  for	  the	  wars.	  	  	  As	   mentioned	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   this	   paper,	   the	   Pentagon	   also	   publishes	   an	  “Estimated	  Cost	  to	  Each	  Taxpayer	  for	  the	  Wars	  in	  Afghanistan,	  Iraq	  and	  Syria.”	  In	  the	  July	  2017	  report,	  the	  Pentagon	  estimated	  a	  total	  for	  Afghanistan,	  Iraq,	  and	  Syria	  of	  $1.52	  trillion.	  The	  Department	  of	  Defense	  estimated	  a	  total	  cost	  to	  the	  single	  individual	  taxpayer	  of	  $7,740	  from	  FY2001-­‐‑FY2018.142	  	  If	  this	  report	  only	  counted	  DOD	  spending,	  the	  estimate	  of	  annual	  bill	  per	  taxpayer	  would	  be	  essentially	  the	  same	  as	  the	  Pentagon’s.	   	  But,	  as	  this	  report	  has	  argued,	  the	  counterterror	  wars	  have	  cost	  more	  when	  we	  consider	  the	  role	  of	  government	  departments	  and	  wars’	  effects	  on	  the	  Pentagon	  base	  budget.	  	  Using	  this	  more	  comprehensive	  estimate	  of	  all	   the	  global	  war	  on	   terror	  costs	  since	  2001,	  and	  using	   	   the	  same	  number	  of	  taxpayers	   that	   the	  DOD	  uses,	   this	  report	  estimates	   that	   the	  costs	  of	  war	  over	   this	  period,	  FY2001-­‐‑FY2018,	   is	   $23,386	   per	   taxpayer.	   Yet,	   since	   the	  wars	   are	   essentially	   paid	   for	   by	  borrowing,	  neither	  number	  is	  reflective	  of	  the	  true	  costs	  of	  war.	  	   Figure	  7,	  below,	  compares	  the	  annual	  bill	  per	  taxpayer	  using	  the	  two	  different	  ledgers,	  the	   more	   comprehensive	   accounting	   this	   report	   uses	   with	   the	   Department	   of	   Defense	  accounting	  released	  in	  July	  2017.	  	  	  	  	  	  
                                                140	  For	  example,	  an	  unclassified	  Pentagon	  accounting	  of	  "Costs	  of	  War	  through	  November	  30,	  2012"	  reports	  different	  figures	  from	  the	  Belasco	  CRS	  report	  of	  2011	  —	  in	  some	  years	  lower,	  perhaps	  due	  to	  rounding,	  and	  in	  some	  years	  higher	  for	  reasons	  that	  are	  sometimes	  explained.	  Further,	  this	  DOD	  report	  does	  not	  include	  related	  State	  Department	  spending,	  and	  omits	  "non-­‐‑DOD	  classified	  programs."	  The	  DOD	  report	  puts	  "total	  costs"	  of	  war	  at	  1,206.6	  billion	  from	  9/11/2001	  through	  30	  November	  2012.	  Office	  of	  the	  Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  for	  Public	  Affairs,	  unclassified,	  "Costs	  of	  War	  Update	  as	  of	  November	  30,	  2012,"	  Generated	  January	  2,	  2013.	  	  141	  "National	  Defense	  Budget	  Estimates	  for	  FY	  2018"	  Office	  of	  the	  Undersecretary	  of	  Defense	  (Comptroller)	  Revised	  August	  2017,	  Table	  2-­‐‑1,	  http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2018/FY18_Green_Book.pdf.	  	  142	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  “Estimated	  Cost	  to	  Each	  Taxpayer	  for	  the	  Wars	  in	  Afghanistan,	  Iraq	  and	  Syria.”	  July	  2017,	  http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2018/Section_1090_FY17_NDAA_Cost_of_Wars_to_Per_Taxpayer-­‐‑July_2017.pdf.	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Figure	  7.	  Comparison	  of	  DOD	  and	  Costs	  of	  War	  Project	  Estimates	  of	  Annual	  War	  Costs	  
per	  Taxpayer,	  FY2001-­‐‑FY2018143	  
	  	   Other	  experts	  tallying	  the	  costs	  of	  these	  wars	  have	  included	  spending	  for	  other	  war-­‐‑related	   activities,	   such	   as	   by	   the	   Department	   of	   Veterans	   Affairs,	   increases	   in	   Homeland	  Security	   spending	   due	   to	   war,	   and	   future	   costs	   that	   are	   obligations,	   such	   as	   veterans’	  benefits.	  The	  most	  recent	  Congressional	  Research	  Service	  (CRS)	  report	  on	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  wars	   and	   other	   related	   expenses	   of	   December	   2014	   by	   Amy	   Belasco,	   CRS	   specialist	   in	  Defense	  Policy	  and	  Budget,	  takes	  this	  view	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  wars.144	  Belasco’s	  CRS	  report	  includes	  some	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  veterans’	  care,	  but	  does	  not	  include	  disability	  compensation	  costs.	  	  	  	  Belasco	  is	  admittedly	  circumscribed	  by	  accounting	  practices	  in	  the	  Pentagon,	  which	  she	  diplomatically	  notes	  that	  others	  describe	  as	  having	  "limited	  transparency."145	  Despite	  these	  and	  other	  difficulties,	  Belasco's	  outstanding	  work	  remains	  an	  authoritative	  accounting	  
                                                143	  Rounded	  to	  the	  nearest	  dollar.	  	  FY2018	  numbers	  are	  based	  on	  the	  DOD	  projections.	  	  For	  FY2001	  and	  2002,	  I	  have	  added	  the	  total	  spending	  for	  both	  years	  and	  used	  the	  number	  of	  taxpayers	  for	  FY2002.	  Sources:	  Total	  individual	  filers	  from	  DOD	  and	  DOD	  estimate,	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  “Estimated	  Cost	  to	  Each	  Taxpayer	  for	  the	  Wars	  in	  Afghanistan,	  Iraq	  and	  Syria.”	  July	  2017.	  Costs	  of	  War	  Project	  Estimate	  of	  total	  war	  spending,	  not	  including	  future	  spending	  on	  veterans’	  medical	  care	  and	  disability	  from	  Neta	  C.	  Crawford,	  United	  States	  Budgetary	  Costs	  of	  Post-­‐‑9/11	  Wars	  Through	  FY2018:	  A	  Summary	  of	  the	  $5.6	  Trillion	  in	  Costs	  for	  the	  US	  Wars	  in	  Iraq,	  Syria,	  Afghanistan	  and	  Pakistan,	  and	  Post-­‐‑9/11	  Veterans	  Care	  and	  Homeland	  Security”	  October	  2017.	  	  144	  Amy	  Belasco,	  "The	  Cost	  of	  Iraq,	  Afghanistan,	  and	  Other	  Global	  War	  on	  Terror	  Operations	  Since	  9/11,"	  
Congressional	  Research	  Service	  (CRS)	  8	  December	  2014.	  This	  is	  an	  update	  of	  her	  previous	  reports,	  including	  Amy	  Belasco,	  "The	  Cost	  of	  Iraq,	  Afghanistan,	  and	  Other	  Global	  War	  on	  Terror	  Operations	  Since	  9/11,"	  
Congressional	  Research	  Service,	  29	  March	  2011.	  More	  recent	  numbers	  on	  appropriations	  are	  found	  in	  Pat	  Towell	  and	  Amy	  Belasco,	  "Defense:	  FY2014	  Authorization	  and	  Appropriations,"	  Congressional	  Research	  Service,	  R43323,	  8	  January	  2014.	  Towell	  and	  Belasco's	  paper	  recounts	  the	  uncertainty	  over	  budgeting	  due	  to	  the	  Budget	  Control	  Act,	  sequester	  and	  continuing	  resolutions	  in	  late	  2013.	  145	  Belasco,	  "The	  Cost	  of	  Iraq,	  Afghanistan,	  and	  Other	  Global	  War	  on	  Terror	  Operations	  Since	  9/11,"	  
Congressional	  Research	  Service,	  29	  March	  2011,	  p.	  42.	  
2001-
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
DOD Estimate 112 300 366 450 524 725 771 694 767 719 567 405 302 263 203 290 281 
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of	   major	   expenses	   and	   this	   report	   has	   relied	   on	   her	   reporting	   of	   DOD	   and	   State	  Department/USAID	  spending	  through	  FY2014.	  	  	  While	  such	  focused	  accounts	  are	  useful	  for	  some	  purposes,	  they	  understate	  the	  wider	  budgetary	  impact	  of	  the	  wars	  and	  their	  long-­‐‑term	  implications	  for	  US	  government	  spending.	  Thus,	  Belasco’s	  CRS	  report	  does	  not	  include	  everything	  that	  seems	  relevant	  to	  an	  accounting	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  post-­‐‑9/11	  US	  wars.	  For	  instance,	  the	  CRS	  Belasco	  report	  does	  not	  include	  the	   Homeland	   Security	   budget	   related	   to	   terrorism.	   Further,	   while	   Belasco	   does	   count	  appropriations	  for	  VA	  medical	  expenses,	  she	  does	  not	  consider	  the	  costs	  of	  future	  obligations	  to	  veterans	  nor	  estimate	  the	  costs	  of	  interests	  on	  borrowing	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  wars.	   	  Belasco	  notes	  that,	  "Other	  observers	  and	  analysts	  define	  war	  costs	  more	  broadly	  than	  congressional	  appropriations	   and	   include	   estimates	   of	   the	   life-­‐‑time	   costs	   of	   caring	   for	   OEF/OIF/OND	  veterans,	  imputed	  interest	  costs	  on	  the	  deficit,	  or	  increases	  in	  DOD’s	  base	  budget	  deemed	  to	  be	  a	  consequence	  of	  support	  for	  the	  war.”	  	  Belasco	  goes	  on	  to	  say	  that	  “Such	  costs	  are	  difficult	  to	  compute,	  subject	  to	  extensive	  caveats,	  and	  often	  based	  on	  methodologies	  that	  may	  not	  be	  appropriate."146	  	  Belasco	  is	  correct.	  	  The	  approach	  taken	  by	  the	  Costs	  of	  War	  Project,	  and	  by	  Bilmes	  and	  Stiglitz,	   is	   more	   inclusive.147	   As	   a	   result,	   and	   some	   of	   the	   estimates,	   especially	   of	   likely	  increases	  to	  the	  Pentagon	  base	  budget	  and	  future	  costs,	  are	   subject	   to	   important	  caveats,	  which	  are	  discussed	  in	  what	  follows.	  Further,	  Belasco	  had	  a	  somewhat	  different	  aim	  —	  to	  tell	   Congress	   how	   much	   it	   had	   appropriated	   for	   war	   related	   purposes.	   Similarly,	   the	  Department	   of	  Defense	  was	   tasked	  with	   reporting	   only	   its	   spending	   on	   the	   defined	  OCO	  missions.	  	  There	  are	  many	  ways	  to	  think	  about	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  US	  war	  depending	  on	  one's	  assumptions	  about	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  wars,	  how	  emergency	  costs	  differ	  from	  and	  are	  related	  to	   the	   costs	   that	   have	   been	   institutionalized	   in	   the	   Pentagon's	   base	   budget,	   and	   how	   to	  estimate	  the	  future	  obligations	  for	  the	  care	  of	  veterans	  as	  a	  cost	  of	  the	  ongoing	  wars.	  	  The	  aim	  in	  this	  report	  is	  to	  give	  an	  accounting	  of	  what	  has	  been	  appropriated	  for	  the	  major	  war	  zones	  and	  in	  war	  related	  spending.	  The	  Department	  of	  Defense	  and	  Belasco’s	  CRS	  numbers	  are	  thus	  the	  tip	  of	  the	  iceberg.	  	  	  	  From	  the	  beginning,	  keeping	  track	  of	  war	  and	  war-­‐‑related	  spending	  has	  not	  been	  easy	  for	  the	  average	  citizen	  or	  journalist.	  	  The	  Brookings	  Institution,	  Anthony	  Cordesman	  at	  the	  Center	  for	  Strategic	  and	  International	  Studies,	  and	  the	  National	  Priorities	  Project,	  have	  also	  tried	  to	  clarify	  the	  funding	  and	  other	  metrics	  associated	  with	  America’s	  longest	  wars.148	  But,	  this	  is	  no	  easy	  task	  for	  any	  war,	  and	  these	  wars	  have	  been	  particularly	  challenging.	  	  Specifically,	   Congress	   has	   not	   funded	   these	   wars	   as	   it	   has	   funded	   past	   wars,	   by	  enacting	  a	  war	  tax	  or	  selling	  large	  numbers	  of	  war	  bonds,	  which	  would	  made	  these	  "pay	  as	  
                                                146	  Belasco,	  "The	  Cost	  of	  Iraq,	  Afghanistan,	  and	  Other	  Global	  War	  on	  Terror	  Operations	  Since	  9/11,"	  2011,	  p.	  3.	  147	  Joseph	  E.	  Stiglitz	  and	  Linda	  J.	  Bilmes,	  The	  Three	  Trillion	  Dollar	  War:	  The	  True	  Costs	  of	  the	  Iraq	  Conflict	  (New	  York:	  Norton,	  2008).	  148	  See	  for	  instance,	  Anthony	  H.	  Cordesman,	  “U.S.	  Military	  Spending:	  The	  Cost	  of	  Wars,”	  CSIS,	  10	  July	  2017,	  https://csis-­‐‑prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-­‐‑public/publication/170710_Cost_War_AHC.pdf?am9DzafqgSHdhfNj2mvflnZUyM5j4L8M.	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you	  go"	  wars.149	  Hence	  DOD	  and	  State	  Department	  OCO	  spending	  are	  considered	  here	  as	  borrowed.	   	   This	   report	   has	   dealt	  with	   this	   layer	   of	   complexity	   by	   including	   the	   costs	   of	  borrowing	  as	  an	  expense	  in	  each	  fiscal	  year,	  just	  as	  individuals	  would	  include	  the	  costs	  of	  borrowing	  on	  a	  home	  or	  a	  car	  when	  they	  calculate	  their	  expenses.	  The	  cost	  of	  future	  interest	  on	   the	   borrowing	   entailed	   by	   deficit	   spending	   for	   these	  wars	   is	   suggested	   as	   a	   separate	  category	  —	  the	  US	  could	  change	  the	  way	  we	  pay	  for	  these	  wars,	  much	  the	  same	  way	  that	  someone	   paying	   back	   a	   car	   loan	   or	   home	  mortgage	  might	   accelerate	   their	   payments	   or	  refinance.	  	  This	   gets	   to	   the	   general	   problem	   of	   the	   difficulty	   in	   estimating	   future	   costs.	   The	  Congressional	  Budget	  Office	   projects	   that	   that	   costs	   of	   executing	   the	  Pentagon's	   plans	   in	  future	  years	  will	  be	  higher	  than	  the	  Pentagon	  has	  suggested	  in	  its	  own	  projections.150	  For	  instance,	   US	   slowed	   the	   pace	   of	   its	   withdrawal	   from	   Afghanistan,	   only	   to	   announce	   an	  increase	  in	  troops	  in	  August	  2017.	  And,	  as	  this	  report	  emphasized	  above,	  because	  these	  wars	  are	  ongoing,	  it	  is	  uncertain	  how	  many	  more	  service	  members	  will	  be	  wounded	  and	  need	  care	  over	  time.	  	   Another	  complication	  is	  that	  some	  of	  what	  is	  included	  in	  the	  White	  House’s	  Office	  of	  Management	  and	  Budget	  and	  Pentagon	  criteria	  for	  OCO	  spending	  is	  in	  need	  of	  updating,	  as	  discussed	   above.	   Specifically,	   though	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   war	   in	   Afghanistan	   widened	   into	  Pakistan	  in	  2002	  and	  is	  included	  in	  the	  OMB	  criteria,	  later	  expansions	  are	  not	  included	  in	  the	  OMB	  criteria.	  These	  include	  when	  the	  US	  expanded	  its	  war	  into	  Syria	  in	  August	  2014	  and	  when	  the	  US	  began	  operations	  in	  Libya	  against	  ISIS	  in	  2016.	  	  	   Furthermore,	  the	  US	  federal	  budgeting	  process	  is	  itself	  complicated,	  and	  spending	  on	  the	   post-­‐‑	   9/11	   wars	   has	   never	   been	   part	   of	   regular	   appropriations	   processes.	   While	  Congressional	   appropriations	  were	   initially	   described	   as	   “emergency”	  war	   spending,	   the	  Congress	  and	   the	  Executive	  Branch	   currently	  describe	   the	  wars	   in	  Afghanistan,	  Pakistan,	  Iraq,	  and	  Syria	  as	  Overseas	  Contingency	  Operations	  (OCO).	  	  	  	  	  Adding	  a	  layer	  of	  uncertainty,	  the	  budget	  can	  change	  during	  a	  fiscal	  year.	  Specifically,	  while	  a	  President	  might	  request	  a	  certain	  amount,	  adjustments	  may	  be	  made	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  a	  fiscal	  year,	  such	  as	  when	  the	  Trump	  administration	  announced	  that	  it	  wanted	  to	  increase	  US	  military	   spending	  overall,	   as	  well	   as	   spending	  on	   the	  ongoing	  wars.	  During	   the	  Bush,	  Obama,	   and	  now	   the	  Trump	  administrations,	   Congress	   has	   consistently	   authorized	  more	  money	  than	  requested	  by	  the	  administrations.	  Recently,	  for	  instance,	  while	  President	  Trump	  requested	   a	   $603	   billion	   total	   Defense	   budget,	   members	   of	   Congress	   proposed	   adding	  another	  $18.5	  billion	  to	  that	  total;	  Trump	  had	  requested	  $64.6	  billion	  for	  OCO,	  but	  the	  House	  Armed	  Service	  Committee	  proposed	  a	  budget	  of	  $75	  billion.151	  
                                                149	  The	  Treasury	  Department	  did	  sell	  a	  small	  number	  of	  Patriot	  Savings	  bonds	  from	  December	  2001	  to	  December	  2011.	  See	  https://www.treasurydirect.gov/indiv/research/indepth/ebonds/res_e_bonds_eepatriotbond.htm.	  	  150	  Congressional	  Budget	  Office,	  "Long-­‐‑Term	  Implications	  of	  the	  2016	  Future	  Years	  Defense	  Program,"	  (CBO,	  January	  2016).	  151	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  “Defense	  Budget	  Overview:	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  Defense	  Fiscal	  Year	  2018,”	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  As	  if	  this	  were	  not	  complicated	  enough,	  there	  are	  two	  additional	  wrinkles	  —	  flexible	  funding	  and	  the	  Budget	  Control	  Act	  of	  2011.	  Flexible	  funding	  has	  been	  used	  by	  the	  Pentagon	  since	  the	  start	  of	  the	  wars.	  	  As	  the	  Congressional	  Research	  Service’s	  Amy	  Belasco	  reported,	  “Flexible	  funds	  have	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  war	  funding,	  making	  up	  a	  significant	  share	  of	  total	  funding	  ranging	  from	  a	  high	  of	  100%	  in	  FY2001	  immediately	  after	  the	  9/11	  attacks	  to	   a	   low	  of	  7%	   in	  FY2003.	  Between	  FY2005	  and	  FY2014,	   flexible	  war	   funding	   fluctuated	  between	  15%	  and	  23%	  of	  total	  DOD	  war	  funding.	  After	  FY2008,	  the	  share	  of	  flexible	  funding	  enacted	  declined,	  presumably	  reflecting	  less	  uncertainty	  as	  war	  needs	  decline.	  The	  FY2015	  DOD	  request	  reverses	   this	   trend,	  rising	   to	  26%	  of	  war	   funding.”152	  While	   flexible	   funding	  makes	   it	  possible	   for	   the	  Pentagon	  to	  move	  resources	  quickly,	  without	  having	  to	  wait	   for	  specific	  Congressional	  authorization,	  there	  is	  decreased	  transparency.	  	  	  Further,	  reporting	  for	  previous	  spending	  is	  not	  always	  accurate.	  For	  instance,	  in	  June	  2016,	  the	  Inspector	  General	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  Defense	  published	  a	  report	  showing	  that	  the	  Air	  Force	  has	  underreported	   the	  costs	  of	   its	  air	  war	   in	  Syria.	  A	   few	  years	  earlier,	   the	  Inspector	  General	  reported	  that	  the	  Marine	  Corp	  had	  produced	  unreliable	  data	  that	  included	  inaccuracies	  totaling	  more	  than	  $1	  billion	  in	  FY2008.153	  	  	   Another	  factor	  making	  the	  total	  costs	  of	  the	  war	  difficult	  to	  track	  has	  been	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  Budget	  Control	  Act	  of	  2011	  and	  sequestration	  (automatic	  across-­‐‑the-­‐‑board	  spending	  cuts)	   applied	   to	   the	  Pentagon’s	  base	  military	  budget.	  OCO	  spending	   is	  not	   capped	  by	   the	  Budget	  Control	  Act.	  As	  a	  consequence,	   the	  Obama	  administration	  began	  to	  put	   items	  that	  would	   normally	   have	   been	   in	   the	   base	   Pentagon	   budget	   into	   the	   OCO	   request.	   The	   US	  Government	  Accountability	  Office	  (GAO)	  has	  argued	  that	  instead,	  certain	  activities	  currently	  covered	  in	  the	  Pentagon’s	  OCO	  budget	  should	  go	  into	  the	  base	  budget	  to	  reflect	  the	  fact	  that	  some	  OCO	  spending	  is	  not	  included	  in	  activities	  recognized	  by	  Congress	  as	  statutory	  costs	  of	  war.	  Further,	  the	  GAO	  argues	  that	  the	  costs	  the	  Pentagon	  has	  identified	  as	  those	  which	  will	  “endure”	  following	  the	  end	  of	  the	  specific	  wars	  should	  be	  transferred	  into	  the	  base	  budget.154	  Todd	  Harrison	  at	  the	  Center	  for	  Strategic	  and	  International	  Studies	  argues	  that,	  “since	  the	  BCA	   was	   enacted,	   OCO	   funding	   has	   become	   a	   convenient	   tool	   for	   Congress	   and	   DoD	   to	  
                                                http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2018/fy2018_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.	  	  Mike	  Stone,	  “House	  Committee	  Eyes	  $18.5	  Billion	  Increase	  to	  Trump	  Defense	  Budget,”	  Reuters,	  26	  June	  2017.	  	  http://www.reuters.com/article/us-­‐‑usa-­‐‑defense-­‐‑budget-­‐‑idUSKBN19H2QB.	  	  152	  Amy	  Belasco,	  "The	  Cost	  of	  Iraq,	  Afghanistan,	  and	  Other	  Global	  War	  on	  Terror	  Operations	  Since	  9/11,"	  
Congressional	  Research	  Service	  (CRS)	  8	  December	  2014,	  p.	  50.	  153	  	  The	  Pentagon	  provides	  limited	  visibility	  in	  its	  accountability.	  See	  the	  Government	  Accountability	  Office,	  "Global	  War	  on	  Terrorism:	  DOD	  Needs	  to	  Improve	  the	  Reliability	  of	  Cost	  Data	  and	  Provide	  Additional	  Guidance	  to	  Control	  Costs,"	  GAO-­‐‑05-­‐‑882,	  September	  2005.	  Inspector	  General,	  US	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  "Additional	  Controls	  Needed	  to	  Issue	  Reliable	  Cost	  of	  War	  Reports	  that	  Accurately	  Reflect	  the	  Status	  of	  Air	  Force	  Operation	  Inherent	  Resolve	  Funds,"	  DOD,	  23	  June	  2016,	  http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/documents/DODIG-­‐‑2016-­‐‑102.pdf.	  Accessed	  30	  July	  2016.	  Inspector	  General,	  US	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  "Cost	  of	  War	  Data	  for	  Marine	  Corps	  Contingency	  Operations	  were	  not	  Reliable,"	  22	  July	  2011.	  http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/documents/D-­‐‑2011-­‐‑090.pdf.	  	  154	  United	  States	  Government	  Accountability	  Office,	  “Overseas	  Contingency	  Operations:	  OMB	  and	  DOD	  Should	  Revise	  the	  Criteria	  for	  Determining	  Eligible	  Costs	  and	  Identify	  Costs	  Likely	  to	  Endure	  Long	  Term,”	  January	  2017.	  http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/682158.pdf.	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negotiate	   around	   the	  budget	   caps.”155	  Harrison	   argues	   that	  while	  President	  Bush	  did	   the	  same	  with	  the	  OCO	  budget,	  the	  practice	  of	  slipping	  base	  budget	  items	  into	  the	  OCO	  greatly	  expanded	   in	   the	  request	   for	  FY2014.	  Harrison	  suggests	   that	  $20-­‐‑30	  billion	  of	   the	  current	  OCO	  budget	  is	  actually	  properly	  seen	  as	  spending	  for	  the	  base	  budget	  and	  that	  the	  Pentagon	  has	  essentially	  acknowledged	  that	  this	  is	  the	  case.156	  	  	  	   In	   its	   estimates	   for	   the	   Costs	   of	  War	   Project,	   this	   report	   has	   deliberately	   taken	   a	  comprehensive	  approach	  to	  the	  budgetary	  costs	  of	  these	  wars.	  	  For	  example,	  as	  discussed	  above,	   this	   report	   has	   included	   a	   portion	   of	   the	   base	   military	   budget	   that	   supports	   the	  ongoing	  wars	  –	  the	  wartime	  environment	  has	  led	  to	  increases	  in	  the	  Pentagon’s	  base	  budget	  that	  would	  likely	  not	  have	  occurred	  had	  the	  US	  not	  been	  at	  war,	  such	  as	  significant	  increases	  in	  pay	  and	  benefits	  for	  soldiers,	  and	  ongoing	  health	  care	  costs.	  	  This	  report	  argues	  that	  these	  additions	  to	  the	  Pentagon’s	  base	  budget,	  while	  somewhat	  normalized	  in	  the	  generally	  higher	  overall	  Pentagon	  budget,	  should	  be	  considered	  war	  related.	  	  If	  one	  accepts	  this	  assumption,	  the	  question	  then	  becomes,	  how	  much	  of	  the	  larger	  base	  budget	  can	  be	  accounted	  for	  by	  the	  wars.	  This	  report	  used	  the	  DOD	  OCO	  budget	  as	  its	  guide,	  calculating	  additions	  to	  the	  DOD	  base	  budget	  at	  30	  percent	  of	  OCO	  spending	  from	  2001-­‐‑2003;	  40	  percent	  of	  OCO	  from	  2004-­‐‑2008;	  and	  50	  percent	  from	  2009-­‐‑2018.	  	  But	  this	  estimate	  is	  also	  conservative.	  To	  underscore	  what	  this	  report	  noted	  in	  the	  main	   body	   of	   the	   paper,	   this	   report	   has	   not	   included	   here	   state	   and	   local	   government	  expenses	  related	  to	  medical	  care	  of	  veterans	  and	  homeland	  security.	  Nor	  does	  this	  report	  calculate	   the	   macro-­‐‑economic	   costs	   of	   war	   for	   the	   US	   economy.	   And	   while	   this	   report	  discusses	  some	  of	  the	  ways	  that	  families	  bear	  the	  burden	  of	  caring	  for	  seriously	  veterans,	  I	  have	  not	  added	  a	  value	  for	  the	  costs	  of	  their	  uncompensated	  care.	  The	  United	  States	  Congress	  has	  used	  a	  definition	  of	  emergency	  funding	  for	  the	  wars	  as	  spending	  that	  is	  "unanticipated"	  —	  "sudden,"	  "urgent,"	  unforeseen"	  and	  "temporary."157	  But	  some	  costs	  of	  the	  wars	  do	  not	  fall	  into	  the	  category	  of	  emergency	  spending;	  these	  expenses	  have	  been	  institutionalized,	  for	  example,	  into	  the	  spending	  of	  the	  Departments	  of	  Veterans	  Affairs	  and	  Homeland	  Security.	  Some	   elements	   of	   the	   Global	  War	   on	   Terror	   have	   been	   normalized	   in	   the	   budget	   of	   the	  Department	   of	  Homeland	   Security	   (e.g.	   border	   control).	   This	   report	   does	   not	   count	   such	  costs	  in	  its	  estimate	  of	  total	  war	  costs,	  even	  though	  they	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  costs	  of	  what	  has	  become	  a	  very	  long	  war	  on	  terror.	  This	  report	  does	  not	  do	  this	  because,	  for	  example,	  it	   is	  difficult	  to	  disentangle	  the	  costs	  of	  border	  control	  for	  economic	  migrants	  versus	  the	  expenses	  on	  border	  control	  that	  are	  focused	  solely	  on	  keeping	  out	  potential	  terrorists.	  	  In	  sum,	  while	  the	  Costs	  of	  War	  Project	  estimate	  is	  more	  comprehensive	  than	  many	  accounts,	  it	  still	  does	  not	  include	  all	  the	  budgetary	  and	  economic	  costs	  for	  the	  US	  associated	  with	  the	  wars	  in	  Iraq	  and	  Syria	  and	  Afghanistan	  and	  Pakistan	  and	  the	  larger	  war	  on	  terror.	  	  This	  paper	  has	  made	  methods	  and	  choices	  explicit	  so	  that	  readers	  can	  make	  their	  own	  
                                                155	  Todd	  Harrison,	  “The	  Enduring	  Dilemma	  of	  Overseas	  Contingency	  Operations	  Funding,”	  Transition	  45,	  January	  2017	  http://defense360.csis.org/wp-­‐‑content/uploads/2017/01/Transition45-­‐‑Harrison-­‐‑OCO-­‐‑1.pdf,	  p.	  2.	  156	  Harrison,	  “The	  Enduring	  Dilemma	  of	  Overseas	  Contingency	  Operations	  Funding,”	  p.	  3.	  157	  Budget	  Control	  Act	  of	  2011,	  https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-­‐‑congress/senate-­‐‑bill/365/text.	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judgments	  about	  the	  information.	  When,	  for	  various	  reasons,	  numbers	  were	  not	  available,	  this	   report	   makes	   estimates	   based	   on	   previous	   year’s	   funding.	   But	   there	   are	   areas	   of	  uncertainty,	  as	  already	  acknowledged.	  	  For	  instance,	  this	  paper’s	  estimates	  for	  future	  costs	  of	  interest	  on	  the	  debt	  associated	  with	  war	  could	  be	  high	  if	  the	  US	  chooses	  to	  change	  the	  way	  it	  pays	  for	  the	  wars.	  	  Or	  these	  projections	  could	  be	  low	  if	  the	  US	  continues	  its	  wars	  over	  many	  more	   years.	   	   Additionally,	   as	   these	   wars,	   the	   longest	   in	   US	   history,	   have	   been	  institutionalized,	   it	  will	   become	   increasingly	  difficult	   to	  disentangle	   the	  parts	  of	   the	  base	  Pentagon	   budget	   that	   are	   actually	   war-­‐‑related	   costs,	   and	   what	   parts	   of	   the	   special	   OCO	  appropriations	  are	  better	  considered	  to	  be	  base	  budget	  costs.	  	  	  	  	  Finally,	  the	  Costs	  of	  War	  Project	  is	  often	  asked	  to	  break	  down	  the	  costs	  for	  each	  of	  the	  war	   zones.	   The	   previous	   version	   of	   this	   paper	   assumed	   that	   65	   percent	   of	   the	   costs	   of	  veterans’	  care	  and	  disability	  expenses	  could	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  Iraq	  war.158	  This	  is	  a	  crude	  estimate	  for	  several	  reasons.	  Specifically,	  the	  long	  duration	  of	  these	  wars,	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  occur	  simultaneously,	  involving	  many	  of	  the	  same	  personnel	  and	  equipment,	  has	  meant	  that	  their	   expenses	   and	   future	   costs	   related	   to	   personnel	   are	   increasingly	   difficult	   to	  disaggregate.	  In	  addition,	  Overseas	  Contingency	  Operations	  are	  essentially	  global	  in	  scope	  —	  occurring	  in	  Africa,	  the	  Americas,	  Europe	  and	  Asian	  and	  the	  Pacific	  —	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  major	  designated	  war	  zones.	  Thus,	  while	  more	  soldiers	  served	  in	  Iraq,	  many	  soldiers	  served	  multiple	  deployments	  in	  both	  war	  zones	  as	  well	  as	  in	  shorter	  term	  operations	  in	  Syria	  and	  Libya.	  Further,	  the	  trauma	  and	  injury	  soldiers	  experience	  is	  cumulative	  and	  the	  VA	  does	  not	  track	  injuries	  by	  war	  zone,	  but	  by	  time	  of	  service.159	  Similarly,	  equipment	  was	  often	  used	  in	  both	  major	  war	  zones,	  so	  the	  costs	  to	  repair	  and	  replace	  equipment	  may	  not	  be	  separable	  by	  war	  zone	  at	  the	  aggregate	  level.	   	  Further,	  soldier's	  pay,	  death	  gratuity	  benefits	  and	  health	  care	  costs	  rose	  for	  the	  entire	  military,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  they	  were	  deployed	  to	  a	  war	  zone.160	  This	  year’s	  report	  thus	  does	  not	  break	  down	  the	  costs	  by	  war	  zone.	  	  	  	  	  
                                                158	  The	  peak	  number	  of	  troops	  deployed	  in	  Iraq	  was	  170,000	  soldiers	  in	  2007.	  US	  troop	  levels	  in	  Afghanistan	  peaked	  at	  about	  101,000	  in	  2011.	  As	  of	  September	  2017	  more	  than	  20,200	  have	  been	  wounded	  in	  action	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  more	  than	  32,000	  were	  reported	  as	  wounded	  in	  action	  in	  Iraq,	  including	  Operation	  Inherent	  Resolve.	  See	  Department	  of	  Defense	  Casualty	  Statistics.	  https://www.defense.gov/casualty.pdf.	  	  See	  Catherine	  Lutz,	  "U.S.	  and	  Coalition	  Casualties	  in	  Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan"	  and	  Fischer,	  "A	  Guide	  to	  U.S.	  Military	  Casualty	  Statistics,"	  p.	  1.	  159	  Linda	  Bilmes	  also	  argues	  that	  there	  is	  no	  "reasonable	  way	  to	  divide	  costs."	  Email	  communication,	  20	  June	  2014.	  	  	  160	  For	  instance,	  Congress	  increased	  the	  Death	  Gratuity	  from	  $12,000	  to	  100,000	  for	  all	  active	  duty	  military	  personnel	  in	  2005,	  effective	  in	  FY2006.	  See,	  http://militarypay.defense.gov/Benefits/Death-­‐‑Gratuity/.	  	  Death	  gratuities	  that	  occur	  as	  a	  result	  of	  specific	  operations	  are	  charged	  to	  that	  OCO	  account.	  	  
